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The subtle differences between various forms of political violence makes it easy to confuse and conflate these categories. The Politics of Violence: Revolution in the Modern World (1968), cites Brian Crozier  as asserting that “… terrorism is a weapon of the weak..” (p.33). There may be veracity to this statement since creating an atmosphere of fear and unrest requires fewer resources than an actual coup d’état. A complete government takeover is likely to fail (p.82); due to onerous coordination costs. However, is it reasonable to separate terror from a coup? Temporally, terrorism campaigns could be an antecedent to a full-on takeover by an aspiring political faction.

It is feasible to see terrorism as a higher order good in the political entrepreneurship (p.143) of a coup d’état. Terror alone will not provide a subversive faction with global domination. However, “… countries may be more vulnerable to coups if they have weak political institutions and lack informal institutions that could support resistance against a regime that itself came to power by staging a coup..” (p.5). Terrorist tactics could weaken faith in the existing regime and even persuade the citizenry to support the more capable insurgent faction.

Much of this is subject to institutional scale; utilizing terrorism to cajole a constituency in a tiny banana republic to abandon the current regime is far easier than forming a global caliphate. The topic of scale becomes pronounced when we consider the costs of communication, organization, and reaching consensus on the direction of the political movement. In terms of networking, the costs of striking consensus increase with the size of the take over/ terror plot; as participating actors not only have to consent to the terms of the political action but also contend with “..local power struggles..” (p.621). Reasonably, if terrorism is fraught with organizational costs, a government takeover is much more costly. Although terrorism by design, aims to wear down the enemy (p. 20), it is not farfetched to assume that it could be a long-term strategy for effectively implementing an extralegal regime change Especially, when Palestinians have used terror tactics to advance their aspirations in the territorial expansion (p.32). It would not be outlandish to extrapolate this phenomenon to government takeovers.

If the dissenting organization is to use terrorism as an effective implement in staging a regime overthrow, the coalition needs to be successful. In the event of foiled terror plots, the group losses support among would-be citizens (p.9). Whether it is a legitimate political campaign, an uprising, or a marketing campaign for a consumer product, bad publicity stalls success. Much how recalls have a deleterious effect on the success of companies producing consumer products, failure on the part of terrorists has a similar effect. Reducing the perception of legitimacy and political clout, making it more difficult for citizens to accept the governance of the new regime.

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