Suicide as a Natural Right- Part II

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Part I

The Lockean conception of shelf-ownership does not work if we cannot alienate self-hood. In the context of involuntary slavery, our absolute right (p.10) to self-possession is relinquished through coercive force [1]. The notion of natural rights almost always implies that the individual owns. For instance, the right of free speech codified under the First Amendment of the Constitution implies self-ownership. Individuals embroiled in political debate must utilize the very bodies they own and utilize scarce resources (p.2)to engage in the passionate exchange[2]. There is one glaring flaw that most ethical theorists get dead wrong about natural rights. Our negative rights that are part-and-parcel with our personhood may be self-evident, but they are certainly not inalienable. The American Declaration of Independence echoes this sentiment and forever cements it in the public consciousness: 

We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty, and the pursuit of Happiness.

The claim that these rights are unalienable does not connote ownership of these rights in any meaningful sense. By the inseparable nature of self-ownership and natural rights, we do not truly have unfettered possession of ourselves. The ability to alienate something is that can only be the consequence of ownership. True ownership implies that an individual can transfer, maintain, sell, deface, lease, destroy, etc. the article in question as they see fit. One of the strongest arguments for this radical interpretation of ownership comes from economist and Libertarian theorist Walter Block. Dr. Block writing “..No law should be enacted prohibiting or even limiting in any way people’s rights to alienate those things they own. This is “full monte” alienability, or commodification…” (p. 6) [3]. Block surmises that an unlimited condition of ownership naturally extends to the person, meaning that if an individual chooses to sell themselves into slavery this is legitimate. Unlike the trans-Atlantic slave trade, the individual being sold is consenting to the arrangement [4].

However, most, and moral theorists would suggest that natural rights, especially selfhood cannot be alienated or dispensed with. As our mind and body are typically inseparable; neither can be reallocated nor disposed of. This supposition suffers from an unfortunate fallacy because a person can voluntarily absolve their will and sentience. In the most extreme case, a person could give themselves a lobotomy effectively alienating their will and severing their mind from their corporal body (p.8) [5]. 

There are less extreme examples of people abstractly selling off natural rights in exchange for material gain. One only needs to look to employment contracts to see a ubiquitous example of this selective selling of rights. It is common for employers to include social media policies as a condition of employment. Effectively acting as a voluntarily acknowledged limit on free expression; a right codified under the First Amendment. Regardless of whether this restriction is a temporary sale of this right or permanent alienation it is a legitimate exchange. From the standpoint of Rothbardian contract law, this arrangement fulfills the criteria for an enforceable contract. Under this theory of contract law, the property must be exchanged for the contract to be binding, any other agreement is a mere promise (p.133-135). At the core of an employment contract or conditions of employment, the property is being exchanged. The employer is transferring compensation (monetary and additional benefits) to the employee. This exchange is contingent upon the employee following the company’s internal policies. Indirectly operating as a form of selling or “renting” natural rights in exchange for employment.

Selling property is merely one means of alienating property. Other more drastic measures can achieve this same outcome. The concept that an individual can condemn their property, mirroring the same privilege current held by various tiers of the U.S. government. The only difference is that when the state does it, they do so without the consent of the owner. Even when eminent domain is practiced within the parameters of the takings clause, however, the property owner generally does not have the right to refuse to surrender their property. Regardless of whether they are justly compensated for the relinquishment of their business, land, or home this arrangement is still inherently coercive. In stark contrast, if a property owner dedicates to transfer or otherwise condemn the land they own, this is legitimate. Effectively, suicide is an example of a person opting to condemn themselves. A person choosing to forever dispose of themselves permanently disables their ability to contribute to society; mimicking how governing institutions can decree that land or a build is no longer fit for occupation or commercial use. The state typically initiates such a directive in the context of habitation or use of the property would pose a “safety hazard”. However, a person contemplating “condemning” themselves does not need to fabricate such vague excuses. If they truly own their own body and mind, they do not have to provide any justification for performing such action. Unlike eminent domain, the individual can consent to the decision they have made. 

Most people might argue that allowing others to commit suicide with no mandated intervention would squander human lives [6]. Further supporting this statement by repeating tired platitudes about how it is a permanent solution to a temporary problem. No doubt, suicide does come with a wide array of societal costs. The individual can never be replaced nor can their human capital because no two people have the same experiences. If we set aside the externalities of the act, there’s a deeper conflict at play. There’s a long tradition of property owners having the right to destroy what they own. The right to destroy one’s property has its roots in the doctrines of Roman and English Common law (p.8). Moreover, there is a long-standing tradition that arguably supersedes the concerns of modern environmentalists or other public interest initiatives. The concern for wasting resources was even voiced by John Locke back in the seventeenth century:

The same law of nature, which does by this means give us property, does also bound that property. God has given us all things richly, 1 Tim. vi. 12. is the voice of reason confirmed by inspiration. But how far has he given it to us? To enjoy. As much as anyone can make use of to any advantage of life before it spoils, so much he may by his Tabour fix a property in whatever is beyond this, is more than his share, and belongs to others. Nothing was made by God for man to spoil or destroy. (p.12).

While Locke provides us with prudent advice regarding resource management, it is nevertheless, a suggestion. A just legal system would defend the property owners’ right to dispose of their property how they choose, even if it is considered wasteful. A legal system that has penalties or restrictions impeding the right to destroy one’s property, provides a perverted form of justice. Much like anything else a person owns, they should be able to “destroy” themselves. In a sense, we legally permit other more protracted forms of incremental suicide. For instance, currently, no laws are prohibiting the sale or consumption of sugar-saturated and chemical ladened soft drinks. Although cigarettes are highly taxed and regulated, we still live in a society where smoking is still legally tolerated. Both soda and cigarettes slowly kill the person ingesting either product; despite this fact, these products should remain legal. Following this same logic, if the person should be able to choose what they put into their body, they can choose to also ultimately dispose of their body.

Footnotes

[1]. The account of Slavery in Locke’s Second Treatise of Government (1690).

[2]. An allusion to  Hans-Hermann Hoppe’s theory of Argumentation Ethics.

[3]. In reference to Block’s postulations related to the possibility of voluntary Slavery.

[4]. How slavery was practiced in the United States was a reprehensible institution. The trans-Atlantic slave trade was incompatible with a property rights justification for self-ownership. 

[5]. An example Walter Block borrowed from legal theorist Stephan Kinsella.

[6]. The idea of wasting human life can be applied in an economic sense. The decreasing fertility rates in the Western world present challenges to the labor force and the tax pool. Especially, after all the Baby-boomers die.

The Antitrust Exemptions for Private Conservation Collectives

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Introduction

 

It is intellectually dishonest to frame an argument in a misleading manner. In my previous essay, I explained how antitrust laws obstruct collective conservation efforts. However, I would be remiss if I did not expound upon the antitrust exemptions for specific collective conservation arrangements. Such examples include the Fishermen’s Collective Marketing Act and harvest collectives. There is certainly a formidable argument that antitrust laws could be made less restrictive to facilitate private conservation initiatives. It is still important to acknowledge what exemptions do exist for the sake of conservation.

 

The Precedence of Antitrust Exemptions

 

Antitrust exemptions for various collective arrangements run across many industries. Ranging from Major League Baseball [1], agricultural collectives, to even labor Unions (Adler, 2004, P.37) [2]. Per Adler (2004) the structural architecture of most antitrust exempts stems back to the Capper-Volstead Act.  This act originally provided small-scale farmers with more leverage against large distributors. Enabling them to engage in collective efforts that were mutually beneficial to collective members (Varney, 2010, P.2-3) [3]. The Capper-Volstead Act was oriented towards agricultural collectives but did influence legislation such as The Fishermen’s Collective Marketing Act. Which allowed members to :

 

“Specifically, the FCMA authorizes “persons engaged in the fishing industry” to “collectively catch, produce, prepare for market, process, handle and market… such products of said persons so engaged…”

 

The act does not allow associated firms to initiated prohibited boycotts or refusals to deal. Due to the specified nature of the above exempt activities (Adler, 2004, P.39) [4]. The market behaviors permitted under FCMA are to the benefit of collective members. Unfortunately, there aren’t any terms to enforce catch quotas (Adler, 2004, P.41) [5]. Presents a major problem pertaining to the ability of the FCMA to reduce the environmental impact of over fishing. The facts are once the prices rise the temptation to breach a cartel agreement increases over time.

 

 

Harvest Collectives:

 

Due to the lack of formal property rights and quota enforcement legally acknowledged harvest collectives prove to be effective alternatives. The Pacific Whiting Conservation Cooperative and North Pacific Pollock fishery being fine examples. Often legislation can be easily circumvented. For example, Magnus Act attempted to impose catch limits through a licensing system (Adler, 2004, P.42) [6]. A natural consequence of such measures is the creation of a “race to fish” scenario. Limited licenses, pushed producers to exhaust quotas within 14 days (Adler, 2004, P.42) [7]. Clearly not aligning the incentives of fishing companies with conservative harvesting practices.

 

On the other hand, the Pacific Whiting Conservation Cooperative has achieved greater success.  The cooperative operates by “… allocating portions of the catch among its members, creating informal property rights in the harvest..” (Adler, 2004, P.43) [8]. The allotments were easily determined due to the “coordination costs” being low enough to do so with little hassle (Adler, 2004, P.43) [9]. Per Adler, the implementation of the PWCC increased the recovery of saleable fish by approximately 20%.  Beyond that, it has reduced the number of operating vessels and increased overall fish volume and quality (Adler, 2004, P.43) [10]. The implementation of such collectives not only are more ecologically congenial but are more economically productive. Making it a winning solution and preserving the balance between free markets and environmentalism. Striking the balance that most assume to be unattainable.

 

Does the question now become how do collectives such as PWCC fair under the scrutiny of antitrust laws?  Better than you might think. The Department of Justice (DOJ) found the practices of PWCC to be lawful despite the broad nature of current antitrust laws. The participating companies agreed to “… continue processing, marketing, and selling their products…” in a competitive manner. It was deemed by the DOJ that such coordinated efforts would not substantially reduce supply nor inflate prices (Adler, 2004, P.43) [11].

 

 

Conclusion:

 

Free-market Capitalism and conservation efforts do not need to be adversarial. The PWCC is proof. The interaction between private conservation cooperatives and antitrust laws can contemptuous. Depending on the agreed-upon parameters of the collective it may still be legal. While the ambiguous quiddity of antitrust statues can be an obstacle they are not necessarily a brick wall. Unfortunately, you are somewhat held hostage by another individual’s interpretation of vague laws.

 

Navigating antitrust laws much like another aspect of the law is far from cut-and-dry. It can be mildly tainted with subjectivity. My natural inclination is to abolish such statues. Such a hasty reaction ignores the potential impact on the consumer. There certainly should be a great deal of nuance when addressing the issue of antitrust laws alone. Never mind the extra layer of complexity by examining how these laws interact with conservation initiatives. While such statutes can be restrictive, depending on the circumstances they may not impede the privatization of conservation efforts.

 

 

 

How Antitrust Laws Impede Conservation Efforts

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Introduction:

Quite often capitalism and environmentalism are viewed as being at odds. The very word “industry” conjures up images of factories releasing caustic smog into the air. Filling our waterways with toxic sludge. This perpetuated image is somewhat anachronistic. Stringent environmental regulations strongly discourage such wanton disposal of production byproducts. It should also be noted that the majority of industrial production has shifted overseas.

Despite the persistence of such misconceptions, business interests, and conservation efforts are not antithetical. The proliferation of the “Green” Business movement solidifies this point exquisitely. Environmental consciousness is absolutely imperative for anyone in the business of harvesting natural resources. That includes fishermen, loggers, and even recreational hunters. All groups that have it within their own interest to conserve finite resources. Limited resources in which access is not constrained by definitive property rights.

Due to resources being scant and access unfettered we soon are faced with the Tragedy of the Commons. This concept was first postulated by William Foster Lloyd back in 1833. Then was revived in the modern era and applied to population ethics by Garrett Hardin. Hardin elaborates upon Lloyd’s grazing rights example by stating:

“… the rational herdsman concludes that the only sensible course for him to pursue is to add another animal to his herd. And another; and another…. But this is the conclusion reached by each and every rational herdsman sharing a commons. Therein is the tragedy. Each man is locked into a system that compels him to increase his herd without limit-in a world that is limited. Ruin is the destination..” (Hardin, 1968, P.2) [1].

It only stands to reason that consumption limits need to be placed upon commonly shared resources. Typically, such restrictions take the form of government regulations. Couldn’t private fishing firms merely mutually agree upon daily catch quotas? Per researcher Bruce Yandle “… Ronald H. Coase has taught us, every firm is a transaction-cost minimizer..” (Yandle 1998, P.7) [2]. Another way of putting it is that private firms could more efficiently and effectively coordinate such measures. Private enterprises face one large obstacle and that is antitrust laws. Frequently antitrust laws hamper conservation efforts made by private businesses (Yandel, 1998, P.4)[3]. In this essay, we will examine how mutually agreed upon conservation efforts qualify as antitrust violations.

Per the Law Conservation Collectives = Collusion

Coordinated efforts among private enterprises to conserve a commonly shared resource may be a novel solution. Unfortunately, under current antitrust statues could be defined as a collective effort to constrain competition.  Collusive behavior among competitors is explicitly prohibited under the Sherman Act (1890). Section 1 of the Sherman Act states:

“… every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce…” (Shenfield & Stelzer, 1998, P. 15) [4].

The emphasis on cooperative efforts is considered a major legislative flaw in the Sherman Act (Shenfield & Stelzer, 1998, P. 16) [5].  However, it is broad enough to encompass privately formed conservation collectives. Restricting supply can be construed as an indirect form of pricing fixing. One of the more salient behaviors associated with cartel arrangments (Shenfield & Stelzer, 1998, P. 43)[6]. It seems like such an effort would qualify as an antitrust violation.

The Conspiracy or Cooperation?

The broad interpretation provides some malleability to the application of the law. Which can be a double-edged sword. Above all the intent of Antitrust laws is to act as a form of consumer protection. Insulating patrons from inflated prices and artificially reduced supply (Alder, 2004, P.20) [7].  A laudable goal that could, unfortunately, conflict with other genuine interests such as environmental conservation. For this reason, the courts need to carefully access any potential benefit of the anticompetitive behavior (Adler, 2004, P.21) [8].

Unless protected by statutory exemptions most agreements that seem anti-competitive can be prosecuted under the Sherman Act (Alder, P.10) [9]. The problem becomes that in most cases intentions of the participating businesses are not taken into consideration.  In the case of Manaka v. Monterey Sardine Industries (1941)reflects such a misstep.  Frank Manaka was prohibited from fishing in Monterey Bay by the Monterey Sardine Industries. To make matters worse the local canneries wouldn’t purchase fish from  Manaka. The efforts of the collective were clearly “.. to conserve fish stocks..” (Adler, 2004, P.4) [10].  The court wasn’t on the same page:

“Such an association as that of the boat owners is not freed from the restrictive provisions of the anti-trust act, because they profess in the interest of conservation of important food fish to regulate the price and the manner of taking such fish “unauthorized by legislation and uncontrolled by proper authority.” (Adler, 2004, P.31) [11].

Unless there is clear documentation intentions are subject to speculation. Even there is still the threat of a Per se antitrust violation. Defined as “… the rule permits the court to make a categorical judgment as to the permissibility of a given business practice..” (Adler, 2004, P.22) [12]. Leaving individuals at the mercy of a judge’s digression.  Incredulity towards the claims of colluding businesses seems reasonable. The waters muddied by the faults of human nature.  Cases such as Hawaiian Tuna Packers Ltd. v. Int’l Longshoremen’s & Warehousemen’s Union (1947) the motives were much murkier. The plans to manipulate prices of fish sold to the Hawaiian Tuna Packers cannery by members of Local 150 were not overtly environmentally minded (Alder, P.13) [13].

Have Conservation Regulations Failed?

Informal restrictions in a resource “commons” are far from a new concept. Gentlemen’s agreements managed rights to hunting grounds in medieval Europe. Native tribes indigenous to Pacific Northwest established customary rules for managing salmon fishing (Yandle,1998, P. 9) [14]. It wasn’t until nascent years of the Progressive era that such arrangements became problematic.

In theory, antitrust laws are aimed to protect the customer. However, aren’t “… high-priced fish are preferable to no fish at all?” (Adler, P.11) [15]. This question may sound exaggerated but does hold some merit. Circling back to the case against the Monterrey Sardine Industries, overfishing decimated the fish population in the area (Yandle, 1998 P.14) [16]. Despite the implementation of regulations restricting fishing quotas, 65% of all fisheries are either “.. fully exploited or overexploited…” (Adler, 2004, P.6) [17]. Regulations have made a meager recovery to nearly depleted fish stocks globally. Overall, government initiatives to replenish fish stocks globally have failed (Adler, 2004, P.7) [18].

It is only natural to questions why such efforts end up falling short. It is expected that in the absence of property rights formal restrictions would aid resource conservation. As Bruce Yandle would put it governments often adopt a “one-size-fits-all” solution. When the Canadian government implemented a system of fishing permits, even individuals not actively fishing purchased them. Reducing the fisheries once again to a state of common access (Yandle, 1998, P. 10) [19]. While this is only one example of regulatory failure it demonstrates a common pattern. The porous nature of many regulatory solutions leaves them open to loopholes. Gaps that can be easily exploited.