Time to Restore the Gold Standard- Part V(c): Stability

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However, even if the value of the dollar continues to plummet wouldn’t this pattern be more predictable than the oscillations of a gold-pegged dollar? As mentioned previously, the Federal Reserve does not resolutely adhere to its own monetary rules. These deviations tend to be justified if they are done in the name of maintaining lofty “macroeconomic” targets, such as full employment. Thereby creating distortions that can hamper future investment plans and even anticipated returns on savings. The fact that the cadence in the price level has become more sporadic rather than more predictable (p.7) is a firm indictment of the Federal Reserve’s institutional failure. The common myth that the Great Depression was caused by gold rather than the malfeasance of the Fed is a fallacy that needs to be debunked. The common narrative has been the freely fluctuating value of gold drove the United States into one of the darkest eras of our economic history. To directly indicate that the Great Depression was the byproduct of mistakes (p.4) made our central bank is telling. Unfortunately, the economic calamity of the 1930s was brought on by “… Fed ..not constrained in using those reserves to expand base money, and thus the broader money supply..” (p.5). Once again validating the point that it was an issue in exercising fiscal restraint; the Fed capitulating to the impulse to use money as an instrument of political convenience. It is well noted that raising taxes and cutting welfare programs can be highly unpopular among voters. However, utilizing inflation as a circuitous form of taxation disperses the true costs of government spending, effectively hiding these expenditures from the average voter. It may be the rules of the game that have created past economic turmoil that has been erroneously attributed to gold. In all honesty, making the concept of a rules-based approach to monetary policy questionable at best. In most cases, we cannot trust those tasked with the duties to create and enforce the rules to act in the best interest of the economy. 

The failure of our banking institutions to establish monetary stability is epitomized in the duration of economic downturns and the frequency of banking panics. Yes, economic downturns were more frequent before the Federal Reserve, however, they were shorter in duration. On average approximately seven months long and were “..no more severe..” (p.21). Based upon these facts it is reasonable to infer that the intervention of central banks may only prolong economic depressions. The introduction of the Federal Reserve did little to reduce the frequency of banking panics between 1914-1930 (p.24). The greatest irony being that between 1830-1914 Canada had relatively few bank failures and no reported bank runs (p.27). Not only did Canadian banks hold gold-backed currency this period also overlapped with Canada’s free-banking period. During the 19th century, Canada did not have a central bank (established in 1935) and banking was relatively free of any regulation. Despite this period of Canadian banking history committing the Cardinal sins of having a gold standard and no central bank, the nation enjoyed relative economic stability. This example only further erodes the critiques of the gold standard and claims that central banks are an absolute necessity.

Time to Restore the Gold Standard- Part V(b): Stability

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Even most fiat currency advocates understand this point and attempt to utilize various monetary rules to create some sense of expected steady depreciation of the dollar. The pretense of “stability” is merely an illusion engendered by the rigidity of a rule that limited the amount of inflation allotted per year. The rules-bound approach in the United States permits 2% inflation per year to allow for economic growth. In an attempt to achieve the aims of “full employment” and monetary stability. Few question the fidelity to which the Federal Reserve has adhered to this 2 % annual inflation target. For instance, in 2007 during the nascent period of the economic crisis, the inflation rate was a staggering 4.08%.More than double what is conventionally allotted by the Federal Reserve. Demonstrating that these monetary rules that are meant to maintain the integrity of our money supply are sensitive to exigencies of purported economic calamity. It is well documented that the subprime housing crisis that emerged in 2007 was caused by our governing institutions using the money supply to manipulate interest rates. The prospect of the U.S central bank maintaining the value of our money is marred by the fact they do not consistently abide by these rules. Unfortunately, when it is politically convenient to loosen these parameters of these rules, the Fed does so. Generally, they could not anticipate the emergence of an emergency requiring accommodations in their money management constraints. If the Federal Reserve did unwaveringly adhere to the 2% rule this still is not necessarily the type of stability that should be welcomed. Irrespective of the annual rate of economic growth, this is still at the expense of the purchasing power of the dollar. While the rate of inflation may be predictable, it is a signal that the value of our money will only continue to decrease. The goal of holding any commodity is for the value to increase or remain constant not to wither away to oblivion. 

The instability caused by the Federal Reserve failing to rigidity follow its own monetary rules has consequences that reverberate throughout the economy. Prices function as a source of information to consumers and producers, that even includes those that produce and hold various forms of money. If the Federal Reserve has been augmenting the money supply to lower interest rates this distorts the loans markets for lenders and borrowers. The argument that the short-run instability of gold makes it necessary for state intervention in the money markets, does not hold water. As lenders and borrows can enter into contractual agreements setting interest requirements; even adjust for immediate price-level variances (p.32). Any attempt to manipulate the money supply to encourage consumption does nothing more than to manipulate the integrity of the money supply Only serving to encourage economic actors to engage in malinvestment, arguably creating moral hazard. Not only does lowering interest rates alter the money supply, but it also encourages the individual who could not otherwise afford to borrow money to do so. Despite the fact, the natural interest rate of the loan is unproportionate to their income and necessary expenses. Unfortunately leading may make borrowers inclined to take uncalculated risks created by an illusory interest rate. That invariably is unsustainable and eventually will be forced back to natural rates, regardless of any distortions the market will self-correct.

If the Federal Reserve’s management rules are effective at warding off volatility, we would expect there to be wild variances in the value of gold-backed money in the pre-central banking era. After being confronted with the number it becomes quite evident that the facts do not comport with popular opinion. One only needs to review the dramatic increase in the rate of inflation in the post-gold economy to see the full effect. From the period of the period between 1790 and 1913 a $100 basket of consumer goods only experienced an $8 variance ($108 in 1913) (p.5-6). However, that same basket of goods had reached the cost of $2,422 by 2008(p5-6), demonstrating the hasten pace of dollar depreciation. It is calculated that the overall rate of inflation between 1879 and 1913 was a meager 0.01 % on a classical gold standard. It should be noted that similar numbers are reflected in the 93 years Great Britain retained a freely fluctuating gold standard (p.3). How skeptics can deride the notion of gold-backed money without address the long-run stability is perplexing. The political and economic establishment has effectively become short-sighted through praising immediate stability over enduring integrity. There is a deeper underlying question regarding this disjointed preference, what does it say about our society? Has our propensity for instant gratification become so entrenched in our culture that it has bled into our governing institutions? If our purported “experts” exalt the virtues of instantaneous band-aid measures over long-run functionality, then the answer to this question is self-evident.

Time to Restore the Gold Standard – Part II

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Part I

Many arguments are defending maintaining a monetary regime centered around fiat currency. However, what are some of the justifications for returning to a gold standard? The current money creation operations guided by the Federal Reserve do not serve the best interests of the American people. Even in monetary regimes that utilize constraining rules such as Nominal GDP Targeting, this only limits the amount of percentage of debasement allotted per a specified time frame (typical a year). But this does little more than slow down the accumulated rate of inflation. Although, such a measure is reflective of overall annual economic growth. Despite the fact production has become more efficient, we still experience an increase in nominal prices year over year. The concern is expressed in George Selgin’s monograph Less Than Zero (1997).

Overall, very few people benefit from the inflationary monetary policy enabled by fiat currency. The concerns regarding liquidity and deflation under a gold standard may have some validity. These concerns are not pressing enough to justify a fiat standard. Inflation reduces the incentives to save money, making it an opportunity cost to holding U.S. Dollars in your savings account. At least investing your money in stock, bonds, real estate, or even cryptocurrencies has the potential of positive return. Whereas Dollars only stand to decrease in value. Various talking heads posturing as financial gurus (Dave Ramsey) tell you to save, save, save! Given the current state of modern monetary policy, there is little incentive to do so. Countries such as Japan have implemented negative interest rate policies eviscerating any incentives to save. Under such conditions, even frivolously sinking money into consumer goods and entertainment may serve as a strategy to hedge against inflation.

The core arguments for why we should return to a gold standard include: avoiding inflation, Cantillon Effects, and more stability. The concern of inflation is self-evident, along with Cantillon Effects acting as an abstract form of regressive taxation. The last argument may seem counterintuitive because there is a well-perpetuated myth about the volatility in the value of gold. In the absence of hard constraints, monetary institutions can keep producing money with impunity leading to hyperinflation. Also, if gold is unstable, would Alan Greenspan even attempt to emulate such a standard while heading the Federal Reserve? Unfortunately, his fidelity to this endeavor is questionable.

Time to Restore The Gold Standard- Part I

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August 2021 marks the fiftieth anniversary of the Nixon administration ending the Bretton Woods Agreement. The conferenced strived to establish a stable global monetary regime in the post-World War II era. Through centering fixed exchange rates around a gold-backed U.S. Dollar. The U.S. permanently closed the gold window in 1971. A gold standard made the money supply inflexible, thus making it impossible to fund the Vietnam War and other government initiatives. Instead of tightening spending when faced with a lack of gold reserves. Nixon declared us all  Keynesians, forever divorcing the U.S. dollar from gold for good.

The Bretton Woods Agreement was not flawed. A clear departure from the classical gold standard (1834-1933) in America; it was still better than a pure fiat standard. The fixed supply of gold in the vaults provides hardline constraints on inflation and government spending, a lesson learned by cryptocurrency creators. Limiting the amount of money produced helps it retain its value. Helping us refrain from reducing our currency to being a worthless piece of “Monopoly money” (think Weimar Germany). Some argue that the threat of hyperinflation in the United States is hyperbole; it is crucial to remember how much the dollar has depreciated since eliminating the fixed-gold standard. Since 1971, the dollar has suffered from a rate of cumulative inflation of 570.90%! Now might be the ideal time to start arguing for a return to the gold standard. This argument is not merely a knee-jerk reaction to the 2008 financial crisis.

Bootleggers and Baptists-XVIII- Fiat Currency

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August 15th marks the fiftieth anniversary of the end of the Bretton Woods agreement. An economic treaty was forged in July 1944 with delegates from forty-four countries converging upon Bretton Woods, New Hampshire. Effectively establishing a global monetary regime where the U.S. Dollar was the reserve currency and was backed by gold. However, this was not the same gold standard that existed in the classical gold period ending in 1933 (p.1). A quasi-gold standard where government institutions (central banks) held the price of gold at a fixed amount (p.17). In the efforts of creating a “.. fixed currency exchange rate system..”. Even after this thin attempt to revive the gold standard imploded on itself, its vestiges still exist today. Banking institutes such as the IMF and the World Bank were established to manage this fixed exchange rate system.

In August of 1971, President Richard Nixon forever severed the U.S. Dollar from Gold. By abolishing the Bretton Woods system. Terminating gold convertibility of the dollar. Essentially setting the stage for the modern global monetary landscape; a 100 % fiat currency standard. The Nixon administration panicked by the lack of gold reserves to cover various rounds of foreign aid and wartime spending decided to terminate the agreement. Succinctly expressing this coercive declaration in the infamous proclamation “.. We are all Keynesians now..”. Officially signaling the formal death of the gold standard. Even though some commentators and economists view the end of Bretton Woods as more figurative than literal death as it truly died at the end of the classical period of the American gold standard.

It can be stated that the dollar significantly depreciated in its purchasing power since the end of Bretton Woods. The dollar experienced an approximate cumulative rate of inflation of 570.9% since 1971. One U.S. dollar in 2021 is equal to $6.71 dollars in 1971! These numbers are unquestionably jarring. It is easy to see why there has been a renewed interest in re-establishing a gold standard since the 2008 market crash. An initiative that has led to a modern renaissance for Austrian Economics. Also, has lent itself to supporting the activism of the Tea Party movement and the political career of Ron Paul. Despite the spirited rallying of the pro-gold camp, the Federal Reserve still exists. Our currency is still nothing more than monopoly money. That only continues to plummet in value. There are many defenders of a fiat currency standard within the political establishment. Ranging from journalists to the wonkish economists and experts exalting the virtues of stable money and currency liquidity. Much like another policy prescription, there are always silent beneficiaries lurking around the corner.

The Bootleggers and Baptists of Fiat Currency

The Public Choice economist Bruce Yandle provided us with the perfect framework for analyzing the odd couple coalitions of modern monetary policy. That is the powerful lens of the Bootleggers and Baptists paradigm. One-half of the coalition acts as the moralizing agent, providing a normative defense of the policy position. In contrast, the Bootleggers quietly reap the benefits of the policy’s consequences. In terms of maintaining the status quo of fiat currency, the Bootleggers and Baptists should be quite obvious. The Baptists are clearly the commentators, academics, journalists, etc. stressing the benefits of fiat currency. Conversely, emphasizing the dangers of a gold standard. Some of our fiat currency Baptists include several luminaries in the fields of journalism and economics. Including Ezra Klein (former Washington Post editor and co-founder of Vox) and Tyler Cowen (chairman and faculty director of the Mercatus Center) (p.2 & 6) [1]. Both gentlemen are far from the only detractors when it comes to re-establishing a gold standard for currency. However, they are respected and high-profile dissenters. Carefully pointing out some of the potential hazards of implementing a gold standard. Arguments including price stability, liquidity issues, deflation, and rigidity in the money supply to just name a few concerns (p.3-20). All these concerns (regardless of their veracity)[2] could be classified as normative concerns, despite these arguments being functional in nature. Through adopting a monetary policy that would be detrimental to the economy, it would be placing the livelihoods of people globally in jeopardy. This concern for the wellbeing of others could be categorized as an ethical concern, making both individuals and their like-minded cohorts Baptists.

The Bootleggers would clearly be the federal government and all adjoining agencies. If you remember early, I mentioned that the main reason for ending the Bretton Woods agreement was that a gold standard was too rigid. Effectively placing a firm constraint (at least in theory) on government spending. By its very nature, a gold standard is quantitively tighter than a fiat system because you can only print redemption notes corresponding with the number of gold reserves on hand. While not ideal, even a fractional reserve gold standard would operate as a better limitation [3] than a pure fiat currency. Not having flexibility in the money supply keeps government spending in line, preventing the implementation (or expansion) of federal entitlement programs and unnecessary military conflicts. Through lifting this hardline limitation, the federal government is no ability to have ability to spend more money. This means more jobs/ job security for bureaucrats. This also means greater opportunities for various pork-barrel pet projects and other superfluous initiatives. Not to mention more perks for public sector employees.

Yes, the Federal Reserve has implemented various monetary rules to attempt curtailing inflation. One example being Nominal GDP Targeting, set up in an attempt to narrow the risk of inflationary volatility. However, such a policy does little to improve the overall longitudinal currency debasement that has accumulated over the past five decades. An over 500% loss in purchasing power is a shocking figure to come to terms with. Nominal GDP Targeting only slows down this process, it does not prevent it.

Foot Notes

  1. I would have included George Selgin. However, being an exponent Free-Banking, he prefers a centralized monetary system. Selgin has been a longtime critic of the United States returning to a gold standard. Often citing the concern of the inflexibility of the money supply in the event of a supply shock.
  2. Free-Banking co-founder Lawrence H. White demolishes these arguments in his paper of the Cato Institute, Recent Arguments against the Gold Standard (2013).
  3. This claim would hold true providing the proper monetary rules are implemented. For example, having high reserve ratio requirements. Current reserve requirements are dismally lax. Back in 1992, reserve ratio requirements were lowered to 10 percent.

Is Fractional Reserve Banking Ethical -Part IV: The Defense of Fractional Reserve Banking

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Part I: Click here.

Part II: Click here.

Part III: Click here.

It is quite clear at this point that followers of Austrian economics view Fractional Reserve Banking as nothing more than a Ponzi Scheme. However, proponents of the Free Banking School (arguably an outgrowth of the Austrian School) believe that this practice is legitimate providing there isn’t any government interference in banking. Even the uninitiated observer will admit that this contingency is a highly unrealistic one. In the modern era, banking continues to be a heavily regulated industry. Free Bankers may have a relatively cogent ethical argument from a theoretical standpoint. After all, it is the responsibility of a mentally competent adult to be aware of the terms of service for any product or service they choose to receive. Ignoring the fine is not an exculpatory factor. Either from a legal standpoint or from an ethical perspective. Also, to be conceptually consistent one should scrutinize multi-level marketing schemes. Such a business model mirrors similarities to Fractional Reserve Banking. Hence why opponents liken it to a Ponzi scheme or pyramid scam.

Argument #1: It Isn’t Fraud.

From the Free Banking perspective, Fractional Reserve Banking is not a fraud. If the banking establishment makes it clear that the services provided constitute Fractional Reserve Banking, then the arrangement is legitimate. This is because the terms of the contract were not violated (p. 87). It would be problematic to present your services as 100 percent reserve banking if it encompasses the practices of the Fractional Reserve System. Fraud would entail a misrepresentation of the bank’s services. 

Taking any measures to prohibit this system of banking is antithetical to the principle of individual freedom. Any such interference would  be obstructing an existing contract between consenting parties. Doing nothing more than disturbing the economic liberty of freedom of contract, which is a pillar of private property rights (p. 87). Individuals who oppose the practice find the freedom of contract argument to be farfetched as few patrons have a firm comprehension of what Fractional Reserve banking entails (p. 88). The naivete of the consumer does not sully the legitimacy of the arrangement. Even Murray Rothbard himself has stated that historically banks have rarely retained a 100 percent reserve system (p.88). Why? Most likely because the banks clients preferred a Fractional Reserve system. If customers prefer an interest payment on their savings versus a maintenance fee for warehousing, so be it (p.88). The market for banking services has responded accordingly.

Circling back to the issue of misrepresentation of services, even the hardline naysayers believe that such a banking system could be admissible under certain conditions. Most notably if there was the further elucidation of the specific details of fractional reserve services. A long-standing concern of economists such as Hans Hermann Hoppe and Walter Block being that such ambiguity makes the practice fraudulent. Creates categorical confusions between money and fiduciary media (p.20-28). Professor Block asserts that the redemption requirements need to be clarified to set aside the concerns of fraud (p. 89). Whereas Block’s counterpart Hoppe stresses that banking institutions should present a warning regarding the suspension of redemption. He analogizes this precautionary courtesy to an option clause. Unfortunately, this concern does not comport with the facts of history. As is evident by the Scottish period of Free-Banking in which specie payment was suspended for decades (p. 89-90).

Another argument that grapples with the question of whether FRB is fraudulent pertains to the ability of the banks to fulfill redemption obligations. Keeping low percentages of reserves on hand turns money redemption into a gamble. However, this concern is inconsequential. Historically even in the absence of government intervention few banks have failed to fulfill any redemption obligations to patrons (p.90). For one, solvent banks are not prone to bank runs. Even in the event, a solvent bank runs out of currency, they can issue an option clause to temporarily suspending redemption. Resolving the issue through contractual channels (p. 91).

Argument #2- The Concerns Over Third-Party Effects Are Not Substantial

The most salient third-party effect or “spill-over effect” confronting the practice of Fractional Reserve Banking is a decreased likelihood of successful redemption. Obviously, in a Fractional Reserve Banking system, the more money that is lent out the fewer reserves the bank will have on-hand. Resulting in adverse consequences for the individual demanding to withdraw money from their account. It should be noted that the depositor agrees to this argument upon opening a bank account. Therefore, by signing on the dotted line of the terms and services of the bank, they choose to assume the risk (p. 93). Despite the risks, bank patrons continue to bank with these institutions. Alone based upon the Rothbardian theory of Demonstrated Preference the individual bankers must benefit from this arrangement. After weighing the benefits concerning the costs (p.93). 

The spill-over effects of Fractional Reserve Banking are not solely confined to banking transactions. The practice has also been claimed to create other distortions throughout the economy. Through how loans are funded it compromises some say the credit structure is compromised. It should be noted that the risks are somewhat minimal. If anything it aides the economy by providing a larger stock of capital (p.94). The issue with this criticism is that much of the instability in the economy comes from the intervention of central banks and governments and not Fractional Reserve Banking. This form of banking is not prone to instability or “cylindrical over-expansion”(p.94). These claims underestimate the fact that the amount of “nominal money” issued offsets the “.. changes in the velocity of money..”. Fractional Reserve banking works to alleviate the disequilibrium and “ business cycle consequences”. Hoppe and the company also assert that any injection of fiduciary media will ultimately result in a business cycle. However, if the increase in fiduciary media is matched by demand a disequilibrium will not arise (p.101-103).

Argument #3: The Popularity of Fractional Reserve Banking.

The popularity of Fractional Reserve Banking is another factor to contend with. Banking customers have demonstrated their preference for FRB. Historically, few banks have remained a 100 percent reserve system. However, customers continued to do business with these institutions (p.95). Contributing to this popularity has been the incentive of banks paying interest on deposits versus requiring a warehousing fee (p.95). Banking patrons also held faith that their bank had sufficient funds to fulfill withdrawal demands. Bank runs were generally triggered by other factors signally insolvency to bank clients. Countries such as the United States with greater propensities towards bank insolvency tend to have many protective laws shielding the banks from market pressures (p.95-96). It should also be noted that back in the 1800s when banking legislation was being discussed in the press the banking system was openly described as a fractional reserve system (p.96). Not only fully informing the average constituent of the details of the Fractional Reserve system, even with this knowledge doing little to dampen its prevalence (p.96).

The use of Fractional Reserve Banking has never been compulsory. There has never been any laws or penalties compelling banking in the United States to levitate towards this specific banking system (p.97). Patrons voluntarily assume the risk of engaging in this variety of banking for the trade-off of being rewarded with an interest payment (p.97). The argument that clients are unwittingly tricked into patronizing an illusory form of banking is dismantled by the fact that banks compete for business. Nothing is stopping an enterprising individual from persuasively selling 100 percent reserve services (p.97).

Is Fractional Reserve Banking Ethical- Part I- An Introduction

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Introduction:

The norms of modern banking are something that most of us take for granted. Few ever question the inner mechanics of such transactions we engage in daily. However, banking has been steeped in a fog of mystery due to complex operations and seldomly failing to fulfill any obligated services. Beyond questioning the functions or internal workings of modern banking even fewer people recognize that most people are participating in a fractional reserve banking system. In a random survey of average people, you will be hard-pressed to find anyone aware of what fractional reserve banking entails nor any intimate understanding of its implications. That is to be excepted considering this is a niche area of expertise that is truly the domain of an economist, banking/ financial specialist. This assumption relieves us of any responsibility to cultivate a better understanding of these systems. After all, this is best left to the experts. How do we know whether there any inherent risks associated with fraction reserve banking? Do we just assume that due to the fact it is the most common banking system that it is the most effective and secure? Better yet, is it even a moral system of banking, or is deceptive by design and tantamount to fraud?

Over the past several decades, a controversy has been brewing among monetary economists concerning fractional reserve banking, Modern economic theorists of the Austrian School who are generally hard money advocates, find fractional reserve banking to illegitimate to its core. Equating it fraud and perceiving it to be antithetical to a free market in money. Whereas free-banking (an economic school that is arguably an outgrowth of the Austrian School) do not see fractional reserve bank as immoral. Rather, such institutions could not only ethically co-exist with 100 % reserve banks but also flourish. Any ethically questionable operations were the byproduct of government intervention and mutually exclusive from the banking practice (p.8). While their Austrian counterparts insist that the practice not only supports the monetary objectives of the state but owes its existence to the state (p.9, p.15-17).In this series of essays, we will examine the ethical arguments for and against fractional reserve banking. To present an unbiased account of the controversy.

What is Fractional Reserve Banking?

Before we can embark upon discussing the ethics of fractional reserve banking is important that we define what it is. On a high level, fractional reserve banking is a system in which banks are required to only hold a fraction of money deposited as reserves. This is done to enable banks to make loans. The recipient of the loan receives a transfer of deposited money upfront which they are expected to pay interest on. The bank customer who deposited the money that was lent out theoretically will receive the money-back in their account with sustained interest. This is done to expand the economy through “freeing capital for lending”. This is done without the depositor relinquishing their claim to this money. Effectively creating more money titles than physical money held on reserve at the bank (p.3)  The foundation of this banking system is fastened to the assumption that most customers with savings accounts will not simultaneously withdraw all of their savings at once. Otherwise, this could lead to what is known as a bank run. A phenomenon where the bank as completely depletes their liquid reserves. Since they are only mandated to hold a relatively small portion of reserves on hand.

Reserve requirements typically hovering around 10 % (presumably applicable to central banks).  Most reserve requirements are contingent on the bank’s size. Banks holding less than $15.2 Million in reserves are exempt from maintaining reserve minimums. The requirement of 10% reserves is applicable to banks holding over $100.2 million in deposits. Per the Garn-St Germain Act  banks are free from any reserve requirements for their first $2 million held. This legislation was initially passed by the Regan administration as a means of relieving pressure on banks as the federal reserve significantly increased interest rates. Banking institutions that hold excess reserves or amounts of deposited money above reserve requirements are entitled to interest payments. Under the Financial Services Regulatory Relief Act of 2006, these interest payments are allocated by the Federal Reserve.

As mentioned above fractional reserve banks issue more money titles than currency on hand. Through this process, they engage in form of indirect “money” creation. The loan itself treats the money titles as being equally as valid as actual currency notes. When the loan is issued the bank “credits” the borrower’s account with an amount equal to the loan, mimicking a transfer of physical cash. The methodology of money creation on the part of fractional-reserve banks has been distilled down to a science. Guided by the money multiplier principle. This concept broadly describes how “.. initial deposit leads to a greater final increase in the total money supply”.  More specifically how much commercial bank money ( demand deposits that can be utilized for credit and debit purposes, basically your residual after reserve requirements) using a defined unit of central bank money. Central bank money is any medium of exchange that these institutions acknowledge as being money. The correct proportion of “money” creation is determined by the below equation:

m=1/R

M=  Money Multiplier, R= Reserve Requirement