Prisoner’s Dilemmas-XXIII- Quiet Quitting

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By now, most of you are aware of the new workplace phenomenon known as Quiet Quitting. Forbes defines Quite Quitting as “..unsatisfied employees put forth the least amount of effort possible to keep their paychecks…”. Most employees might think they are clever for only doing the bare minimum, but managers have their strategy for handling underperforming employees; Dehiring. Instead of outright firing the troublesome employee, management directly acknowledges their dissatisfaction with the job role. The hope is that this might prompt them to find another job.

Dehiring has been described as a win-win scenario because it acknowledges the mutual frustration of the worker and the firm. Side-stepping the legal and psychological hurdles of navigating the labor laws governing terminating a subpar employee. However, what if either employee isn’t getting the hint? Managers tend to be ineffective due to poor communication skills, which could muddle the succinct message of “Please find a new job!”. If there is any breakdown in the messaging, both worker and their boss; will result in a Prisoner’s Dilemma. The ineffectual expression of shared frustration will make this process protracted and end in an actual firing.

The reward for Mutual Cooperation: R= .5

Either the employee or manager could hope; if they play hardball, the other will eventually fold. The manager ultimately hopes the employee will change their ways, it is always easier and cheaper to have a current employee change their attitude than find a new hire. Concurrently, worker wishes that rules will loosen up, higher pay, or lighter workload, banking on the fact that their boss “needs” them.

Both parties holding these zero-sum strategies are being obtuse; neither outcome is realistic. The best approach would be for each coalition in this game (company/management vs. unhappy worker) to directly and honestly express their concerns. Not only would this path be more efficient, but if the manager is faithful to the etiquette of dehiring, the problematic employee should have time to find a new job. 

·     Punishment for Defecting: P=0

It would be improbable to have a central authority that can definitively prove and punish either the manager or the worker for using passive-aggressive or unclear communication. Since this is a game-theoretical model, for the sake of simplicity, let us assign the punishment value at zero.

·     Temptation to Defect: T=1

As mentioned previously, it is tempting to adopt the longshot strategy; after all, either coalition gets all their preferred conditions met; with exerting the least effort possible. It is easy to view ambiguity as an excuse to hold out for a no-compromise solution. 

·     Sucker’s Payoff: S=-1

In a no-compromise strategy, it has win-take-all dynamics. The costs of buckling for either coalition are high. Arguably, the monetary costs are much higher for the firm, but the subjective evaluation of the worker’s disutility of conforming to their boss’s parameters would be difficult to measure. 

Condition 1:

· T>R>P>S

· 1> .5> 0 > -1

Condition 2:

· (T+S)/2<R

· (1+-1)/2 <.5

· (0)/2 <.5

· 0 < .5

Overall, it appears as if the Quiet Quitting controversy, sloppy communication combined with employees and employers giving into their desire to be lazy and have all their preferences met engenders a Prisoner’s Dilemma. 

Prisoner’s Dilemmas: XXII- Anti-Discrimination Laws

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Professor Bryan Caplan makes some impressive observations in his 2020 essay The Anti-Jerk Law. Caplan uses the hypothetical example of an Anti-Jerk law to emphasize the fallacies of anti-discrimination laws. At their core, both the fabricated example of the Anti-Jerk law and current discrimination laws suffer from numerous flaws. Instances of discrimination are not clear-cut, much like how your boss is a jerk is subject to interpretation. But if juries are predisposed to sympathize with instances of discrimination or the censure of a mean boss, this may “… lower the de facto burden of proof…” in ligation cases. More importantly, firms might be less apt to hire individuals that can make discrimination claims. Resulting in more indirect discrimination, creating a cobra effect. Laws and policies; designed to reduce discrimination, increasing discrimination.

Effectively, anti-discrimination laws are prone to create Prisoner’s Dilemmas. Why? Employers and Employees(ethnic minorities, religious minorities, transgender people, homosexuals, women) are predisposed to work against one another. Firms are ligation adverse and seek to avoid lawsuits costs and bad publicity. On the other hand, minority employees (emboldened by anti-discrimination regulations) have laws incentivizing them to pursue maximum damages for any perceived incident of discrimination. It is evident that both incentive structures are at odds and will cause both parties to choose to defect (using the vernacular of game theory) rather than cooperate.

The Calculations:

The above scenario is a zero-sum game; due to neither party wanting to compromise and the perception of winner-take-all dynamics. To numerically determine that this scenario is a Prisoner’s Dilemma, we must validate that the situation satisfies the two conditions expressed by Nordstrom; 1.) T>R>P>S and 2.) (T+S)/2<R.

Defining The Variable:

· Reward For Mutual Cooperation: R =.5

The value of .5 has been assigned for the gains of cooperation because the values expressed are predicated on a significant potential stance of discrimination ligation. The firm could take a chance on a risky employee and an employee could tolerate mild forms of discrimination (insensitive jokes, run-of-the-mill micro-aggressions) and not sue. Functioning as an archetypal compromise, neither party is pleased with the arrangement but still better than non-cooperation. 

· Punishment for Defection: P =0

There is little to no proper punishment for defection. For the hiring company, it is difficult/ nearly impossible to prove that they choose the 20-something, recent college graduate, male over a riskier job application (from an anti-discrimination standpoint). There is virtually no actual punishment despite the formal parameters of discrimination laws. For the employee, since the social norms are aligned with anti-discrimination legislation, the social costs for suing are low (but there might be monetary costs associated with legal action which are difficult to quantify. 

· Temptation to Defection: T=1

The firm has a lot to lose by hiring an employee with a high probability of suing them; the employee has a lot to gain in situations of discrimination.

· Sucker’s Payoff: S=-1

Both parties can lose a lot if the other does not compromise. 

Condition 1:

· T>R>P>S

· 1> .5> 0 > -1

Condition 2:

· (T+S)/2<R

· (1+-1)/2 <.5

· (0)/2 <.5

· 0 < .5

Prima facie, it does seem as if numerically and qualitatively that anti-discrimination laws are inclined to create Prisoner’s Dilemmas.

Prisoner’s Dilemmas XXI: (Part A): The Fiasco on the Vineyard

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The Martha’s Vineyard Immigrant debacle encapsulates the hideous nature of contemporary politics. It is a saga that depicts partisanship, hypocrisy, and lack of concern for effective policy. Both conservatives and the quixotic-minded and progressive residents of Martha’s Vineyard are responsible for this situation.

The controversy began when Republican Governor Ron DeSantis (using tax dollarsflew 50 migrants to the left-leaning tourist island of Martha’s Vineyard. The coordinator of the island’s homeless shelter has publicly expressed that their facility does not have the resources to provide services for the new arrivals. Even stating that the influx of migrants will exacerbate the current housing crisis. Economist Tyler Cowen addresses the scarcity of affordable housing on the island in his latest OP-ED piece:

“…Real estate is very expensive. And the island is strictly zoned, making it hard to build a lot of dense, low-cost housing…

Wages there are below the Massachusetts average, and living expenses are prohibitively expensive. Those realities stem from decisions about land use made by the island’s population. (I am OK with such community-supported zoning restrictions when they apply to very limited local areas, such as Martha’s Vineyard, and there are many options to look elsewhere. The problem arises when they start infesting a larger part of the U.S., as they have.)..”

Stringent zoning ordinances and below-average wages are a recipe for a housing crisis. In 2012, the average home was valued at “..$535,000 but average Islander could afford only $310,000..”.The cost of housing is prohibitive even for U.S. citizens residing on the island, never mind impoverished immigrants looking for better opportunities.

It is difficult to refute that this situation fits within the definition of a Prisoner’s Dilemma because two defecting coalitions made the scenario worse by not compromising. If anything, this occurrence might be a multifaceted Prisoner’s Dilemma; DeSantis owning the Libs isn’t the only game contributing to Martha’s Vineyard fiasco. The progressive islanders have conflicting desires politically, they effectively have had an intra-temporal Prisoner’s Dilemma with themselves. This is where Tyler Cowen’s observation, but the community’s hypocrisy regarding income inequality, comes into play. Because the island’s residents vocally support progressive policies in the name of economic justice. But concurrently, favor zoning ordinances that restrict the supply of homes and artificially inflate the cost of housing.

The model for Validating the Intra-institutional Prisoner’s Dilemma

Applying the model used by Nordstrom to validate Prisoner’s Dilemmas:

Condition 1:

The temptation to Defect (2= Signifies implementing both favorable zoning and left-wing economic policies)> Reward for Cooperation (1= The island recognizes the opportunity cost and amends its zoning laws; only one of the preferred policies is implemented)> Punishment For Defection (0= The majority of residents do not see that both policies cancel each other out)> Sucker’s Payoff (-1= The costs of creating political division by not favoring both varieties of policies).

T(2)> R(1)> P(0)> S(-1).

Condition 2:

(T+S)/2<R

(2+-1)/2 <1 ; (1)/2<1; .5 < 1

Even though the Fiasco on The Vineyard does numerically match the two conditions for a prisoner’s dilemma, this application of the PD incentives dynamic was creative. Game Theory purists might claim that it is erroneous to apply this lens so abstractly. However, the attributes of this intra-coalitional game do look like a cooperative game superficially. But the fact that local government and the constituents are attempting to balance conflicting interests. This situation may even validate Peter Clark’s Paradox of Implicit Logrolling (2021); however, there may be other factors at play. Per the public choice literature on rational ignorance, voters still select policies and elected officials even though they face severe information asymmetries. 

The DeSantis versus Martha’s Vineyard game will be reviewed in part B.