Time to Restore the Gold Standard- Part V(c): Stability

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However, even if the value of the dollar continues to plummet wouldn’t this pattern be more predictable than the oscillations of a gold-pegged dollar? As mentioned previously, the Federal Reserve does not resolutely adhere to its own monetary rules. These deviations tend to be justified if they are done in the name of maintaining lofty “macroeconomic” targets, such as full employment. Thereby creating distortions that can hamper future investment plans and even anticipated returns on savings. The fact that the cadence in the price level has become more sporadic rather than more predictable (p.7) is a firm indictment of the Federal Reserve’s institutional failure. The common myth that the Great Depression was caused by gold rather than the malfeasance of the Fed is a fallacy that needs to be debunked. The common narrative has been the freely fluctuating value of gold drove the United States into one of the darkest eras of our economic history. To directly indicate that the Great Depression was the byproduct of mistakes (p.4) made our central bank is telling. Unfortunately, the economic calamity of the 1930s was brought on by “… Fed ..not constrained in using those reserves to expand base money, and thus the broader money supply..” (p.5). Once again validating the point that it was an issue in exercising fiscal restraint; the Fed capitulating to the impulse to use money as an instrument of political convenience. It is well noted that raising taxes and cutting welfare programs can be highly unpopular among voters. However, utilizing inflation as a circuitous form of taxation disperses the true costs of government spending, effectively hiding these expenditures from the average voter. It may be the rules of the game that have created past economic turmoil that has been erroneously attributed to gold. In all honesty, making the concept of a rules-based approach to monetary policy questionable at best. In most cases, we cannot trust those tasked with the duties to create and enforce the rules to act in the best interest of the economy. 

The failure of our banking institutions to establish monetary stability is epitomized in the duration of economic downturns and the frequency of banking panics. Yes, economic downturns were more frequent before the Federal Reserve, however, they were shorter in duration. On average approximately seven months long and were “..no more severe..” (p.21). Based upon these facts it is reasonable to infer that the intervention of central banks may only prolong economic depressions. The introduction of the Federal Reserve did little to reduce the frequency of banking panics between 1914-1930 (p.24). The greatest irony being that between 1830-1914 Canada had relatively few bank failures and no reported bank runs (p.27). Not only did Canadian banks hold gold-backed currency this period also overlapped with Canada’s free-banking period. During the 19th century, Canada did not have a central bank (established in 1935) and banking was relatively free of any regulation. Despite this period of Canadian banking history committing the Cardinal sins of having a gold standard and no central bank, the nation enjoyed relative economic stability. This example only further erodes the critiques of the gold standard and claims that central banks are an absolute necessity.

Time to Restore the Gold Standard- Part V(b): Stability

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Even most fiat currency advocates understand this point and attempt to utilize various monetary rules to create some sense of expected steady depreciation of the dollar. The pretense of “stability” is merely an illusion engendered by the rigidity of a rule that limited the amount of inflation allotted per year. The rules-bound approach in the United States permits 2% inflation per year to allow for economic growth. In an attempt to achieve the aims of “full employment” and monetary stability. Few question the fidelity to which the Federal Reserve has adhered to this 2 % annual inflation target. For instance, in 2007 during the nascent period of the economic crisis, the inflation rate was a staggering 4.08%.More than double what is conventionally allotted by the Federal Reserve. Demonstrating that these monetary rules that are meant to maintain the integrity of our money supply are sensitive to exigencies of purported economic calamity. It is well documented that the subprime housing crisis that emerged in 2007 was caused by our governing institutions using the money supply to manipulate interest rates. The prospect of the U.S central bank maintaining the value of our money is marred by the fact they do not consistently abide by these rules. Unfortunately, when it is politically convenient to loosen these parameters of these rules, the Fed does so. Generally, they could not anticipate the emergence of an emergency requiring accommodations in their money management constraints. If the Federal Reserve did unwaveringly adhere to the 2% rule this still is not necessarily the type of stability that should be welcomed. Irrespective of the annual rate of economic growth, this is still at the expense of the purchasing power of the dollar. While the rate of inflation may be predictable, it is a signal that the value of our money will only continue to decrease. The goal of holding any commodity is for the value to increase or remain constant not to wither away to oblivion. 

The instability caused by the Federal Reserve failing to rigidity follow its own monetary rules has consequences that reverberate throughout the economy. Prices function as a source of information to consumers and producers, that even includes those that produce and hold various forms of money. If the Federal Reserve has been augmenting the money supply to lower interest rates this distorts the loans markets for lenders and borrowers. The argument that the short-run instability of gold makes it necessary for state intervention in the money markets, does not hold water. As lenders and borrows can enter into contractual agreements setting interest requirements; even adjust for immediate price-level variances (p.32). Any attempt to manipulate the money supply to encourage consumption does nothing more than to manipulate the integrity of the money supply Only serving to encourage economic actors to engage in malinvestment, arguably creating moral hazard. Not only does lowering interest rates alter the money supply, but it also encourages the individual who could not otherwise afford to borrow money to do so. Despite the fact, the natural interest rate of the loan is unproportionate to their income and necessary expenses. Unfortunately leading may make borrowers inclined to take uncalculated risks created by an illusory interest rate. That invariably is unsustainable and eventually will be forced back to natural rates, regardless of any distortions the market will self-correct.

If the Federal Reserve’s management rules are effective at warding off volatility, we would expect there to be wild variances in the value of gold-backed money in the pre-central banking era. After being confronted with the number it becomes quite evident that the facts do not comport with popular opinion. One only needs to review the dramatic increase in the rate of inflation in the post-gold economy to see the full effect. From the period of the period between 1790 and 1913 a $100 basket of consumer goods only experienced an $8 variance ($108 in 1913) (p.5-6). However, that same basket of goods had reached the cost of $2,422 by 2008(p5-6), demonstrating the hasten pace of dollar depreciation. It is calculated that the overall rate of inflation between 1879 and 1913 was a meager 0.01 % on a classical gold standard. It should be noted that similar numbers are reflected in the 93 years Great Britain retained a freely fluctuating gold standard (p.3). How skeptics can deride the notion of gold-backed money without address the long-run stability is perplexing. The political and economic establishment has effectively become short-sighted through praising immediate stability over enduring integrity. There is a deeper underlying question regarding this disjointed preference, what does it say about our society? Has our propensity for instant gratification become so entrenched in our culture that it has bled into our governing institutions? If our purported “experts” exalt the virtues of instantaneous band-aid measures over long-run functionality, then the answer to this question is self-evident.

Bootleggers and Baptists-XVIII- Fiat Currency

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August 15th marks the fiftieth anniversary of the end of the Bretton Woods agreement. An economic treaty was forged in July 1944 with delegates from forty-four countries converging upon Bretton Woods, New Hampshire. Effectively establishing a global monetary regime where the U.S. Dollar was the reserve currency and was backed by gold. However, this was not the same gold standard that existed in the classical gold period ending in 1933 (p.1). A quasi-gold standard where government institutions (central banks) held the price of gold at a fixed amount (p.17). In the efforts of creating a “.. fixed currency exchange rate system..”. Even after this thin attempt to revive the gold standard imploded on itself, its vestiges still exist today. Banking institutes such as the IMF and the World Bank were established to manage this fixed exchange rate system.

In August of 1971, President Richard Nixon forever severed the U.S. Dollar from Gold. By abolishing the Bretton Woods system. Terminating gold convertibility of the dollar. Essentially setting the stage for the modern global monetary landscape; a 100 % fiat currency standard. The Nixon administration panicked by the lack of gold reserves to cover various rounds of foreign aid and wartime spending decided to terminate the agreement. Succinctly expressing this coercive declaration in the infamous proclamation “.. We are all Keynesians now..”. Officially signaling the formal death of the gold standard. Even though some commentators and economists view the end of Bretton Woods as more figurative than literal death as it truly died at the end of the classical period of the American gold standard.

It can be stated that the dollar significantly depreciated in its purchasing power since the end of Bretton Woods. The dollar experienced an approximate cumulative rate of inflation of 570.9% since 1971. One U.S. dollar in 2021 is equal to $6.71 dollars in 1971! These numbers are unquestionably jarring. It is easy to see why there has been a renewed interest in re-establishing a gold standard since the 2008 market crash. An initiative that has led to a modern renaissance for Austrian Economics. Also, has lent itself to supporting the activism of the Tea Party movement and the political career of Ron Paul. Despite the spirited rallying of the pro-gold camp, the Federal Reserve still exists. Our currency is still nothing more than monopoly money. That only continues to plummet in value. There are many defenders of a fiat currency standard within the political establishment. Ranging from journalists to the wonkish economists and experts exalting the virtues of stable money and currency liquidity. Much like another policy prescription, there are always silent beneficiaries lurking around the corner.

The Bootleggers and Baptists of Fiat Currency

The Public Choice economist Bruce Yandle provided us with the perfect framework for analyzing the odd couple coalitions of modern monetary policy. That is the powerful lens of the Bootleggers and Baptists paradigm. One-half of the coalition acts as the moralizing agent, providing a normative defense of the policy position. In contrast, the Bootleggers quietly reap the benefits of the policy’s consequences. In terms of maintaining the status quo of fiat currency, the Bootleggers and Baptists should be quite obvious. The Baptists are clearly the commentators, academics, journalists, etc. stressing the benefits of fiat currency. Conversely, emphasizing the dangers of a gold standard. Some of our fiat currency Baptists include several luminaries in the fields of journalism and economics. Including Ezra Klein (former Washington Post editor and co-founder of Vox) and Tyler Cowen (chairman and faculty director of the Mercatus Center) (p.2 & 6) [1]. Both gentlemen are far from the only detractors when it comes to re-establishing a gold standard for currency. However, they are respected and high-profile dissenters. Carefully pointing out some of the potential hazards of implementing a gold standard. Arguments including price stability, liquidity issues, deflation, and rigidity in the money supply to just name a few concerns (p.3-20). All these concerns (regardless of their veracity)[2] could be classified as normative concerns, despite these arguments being functional in nature. Through adopting a monetary policy that would be detrimental to the economy, it would be placing the livelihoods of people globally in jeopardy. This concern for the wellbeing of others could be categorized as an ethical concern, making both individuals and their like-minded cohorts Baptists.

The Bootleggers would clearly be the federal government and all adjoining agencies. If you remember early, I mentioned that the main reason for ending the Bretton Woods agreement was that a gold standard was too rigid. Effectively placing a firm constraint (at least in theory) on government spending. By its very nature, a gold standard is quantitively tighter than a fiat system because you can only print redemption notes corresponding with the number of gold reserves on hand. While not ideal, even a fractional reserve gold standard would operate as a better limitation [3] than a pure fiat currency. Not having flexibility in the money supply keeps government spending in line, preventing the implementation (or expansion) of federal entitlement programs and unnecessary military conflicts. Through lifting this hardline limitation, the federal government is no ability to have ability to spend more money. This means more jobs/ job security for bureaucrats. This also means greater opportunities for various pork-barrel pet projects and other superfluous initiatives. Not to mention more perks for public sector employees.

Yes, the Federal Reserve has implemented various monetary rules to attempt curtailing inflation. One example being Nominal GDP Targeting, set up in an attempt to narrow the risk of inflationary volatility. However, such a policy does little to improve the overall longitudinal currency debasement that has accumulated over the past five decades. An over 500% loss in purchasing power is a shocking figure to come to terms with. Nominal GDP Targeting only slows down this process, it does not prevent it.

Foot Notes

  1. I would have included George Selgin. However, being an exponent Free-Banking, he prefers a centralized monetary system. Selgin has been a longtime critic of the United States returning to a gold standard. Often citing the concern of the inflexibility of the money supply in the event of a supply shock.
  2. Free-Banking co-founder Lawrence H. White demolishes these arguments in his paper of the Cato Institute, Recent Arguments against the Gold Standard (2013).
  3. This claim would hold true providing the proper monetary rules are implemented. For example, having high reserve ratio requirements. Current reserve requirements are dismally lax. Back in 1992, reserve ratio requirements were lowered to 10 percent.

Is Fractional Reserve Banking Ethical Part V: Conclusion and Compromise

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The debate over whether Fractional Reserve Banking is ethical to proceed over approximately a decade (the late 1980s/ early 1990s to the early 2000s). Resulting from subsequent papers repudiating the previous claims over the researchers on the other side of the issue. It should be noted that in these series of retaliatory papers that technical arguments were presented in tandem with ethical justifications for or against this practice. For the sake of brevity, I chose to focus on the ethical considerations of the topic. However, this does not exclude a potential technical comparison of Fractional Reserve Banking in the future. 

To any reader who has never thoroughly examined nor given a second thought to Fractional Reserve Banking, I hope reading this series of essays was illuminating. Fractional Reserve Banking is arguably the most prevalent banking system globally. Yet, something that impacts our lives daily we never think to question its inner mechanics let alone whether it is ethical. The ethics of banking extend beyond whether the patrons are benefiting at the expense of someone else, either through easy access to loans or interest payment on savings. There are potential ramifications to the economy. 

Distortions in the credit market are precisely the impetus for business cycle calamities such as the cataclysmic burst of the Housing Bubble in 2007. Providing loans backed up by fiduciary media is nothing more than a house of cards waiting to fall done. Artificially manipulating factors such as prices, interests, and money supply can only facilitate the misallocation of resources. Such indicators operate as unspoken signals to consumers and entrepreneurs. Due to this fact, these distortions create an illusory image of the loan market and naturally economic agents respond accordingly (p.108). A fact that both George Selgin and Lawrence White are too quick to refute and dismiss (p.102). This carries the implications of defrauding the economy as a whole versus being isolated to the bank’s customers. Even if you are the type to limit all your transactions to precious metals or cryptocurrency, it is worthwhile to read up on this topic.

Summary of Compelling Arguments From the Austrian School:

It is difficult to say whether the Free-Bankers or the Austrians are on the right side of the debate. Both camps provided some truly convincing arguments. The Austrian opposition notes how ownership can only legitimately be taken on by one person and Fractional Reserve Bank obfuscates this immutable law of property ownership. From a contractual standpoint, that the agreements between banks and clients in such an argument are illegitimate. Since the terms are not only unclear to the typical layman but are a categorical misrepresentation. Presenting fiduciary media as actual money. The disingenuous nature of this faulty contract is only compounded by the fact that these claims for money are based upon the banknotes that are not back by currency or specie. Attempting to redeem them for actual currency is analogous to using a deed for a boat and attempt to claim ownership of a house. Also that it is a false analogy to argue that any devaluation of present money caused by the issue of fiduciary media is no different than an increase in the supply of a good due to protection or harvesting. 

This is because the increase in the supply of lumber from harvesting more oak trees is derived from legitimate market processes and in-turn does not seek to directly devalue anyone else’s property. Also, that in no way can Fractional Reserve Banking represent the Demonstrated preference of bank clients. Demonstrated preference can only be expressed with one’s property. Fractional Reserve Banking by its very nature disrupts this relationship.

Summary of Compelling Free-Banking Arguments:

The Free-Bankers also bring up some compelling moral defenses in favor of Fractional Reserve Banking. They are even bold enough to directly claim the practice is not fraudulent. Through a banking client electing to accept the terms of service regardless of their understanding, the contract is still valid. It would be one thing if these banks purported to practice 100 percent reserve banking, but function as a Fractional Reserve institution. These contracts are formulated between consenting adults, it would be antithetical to the principle of individual freedom to prohibit such arrangements. The real trouble comes from government interference. One only needs to look at the large array of protections awarded to backs through the FDCI to see the true culprit in shielding unsavory banking practices from insolvency or litigation. Also, the ignorance or the naiveté of the consumer is not a reasonable justification for banning a product or service. Even though the risk of a bank run is present, it is a relatively rare occurrence from a historical standpoint. If faced with a potential bank run the bank can issue an option clause suspending redemption, solving the issue through valid contractual recourse. Speaking of redeeming bank deposits. A customer assumes the risk of not being able to redeem money when they agree to open an FRB account. They assume the risk. In turn, for the opportunity cost of having their liquid money held and the potential risk of a bank run/ insolvency, they receive an interest payment. Overall, patrons must prefer Fractional Reserve systems to 100 percent reserve banking. There have never been any governmental decrees in modern history that all banking must be done via a Fractional Reserve System. Despite its flaws, ultimately, the people prefer being paid interest payments versus having to pay warehousing fees.

Can There Be a Compromise?

There are certain aspects of both arguments that appear to be flawed. The Free-Bankers are too lackadaisical when it comes to distortions in the credit structure enabled by Fractional Reserve Banking. The Austrians to some extent seem too rigid in their interpretation of property ownership. Under many of their arguments likening the practice to a Ponzi scheme. Yet, to be conceptually consistent would not these same economists also take issue with multi-level-marketing? Then again it could also be counter-argued that MLM schemes and Fractional Reserve Banking while present similar confusions, property rights have much greater degree clarity in MLM arraignments.

Back in 2000, the economist Jorg Guido Hulsmann wrote an article in the Independent Review refuting the Fractional Reserve practice of creating “money”. Hulsmann (see page 108) much like his anarcho-capitalist counterparts Hoppe and Block are opposed to government intervention. If FRB is morally and technically flawed how can we address the issue of it short-comings without introducing state involvement? In this twenty-year-old article, Hulsmann presents a summary of points previously made by Hoppe and Block that would alleviate some of the issues relating to the categorical confusion. It should be noted that Hulsmann in that these suggestions for informal rules and norms of banking presume no state involvement in banking. Also, the author details the intimate relationship between the FRB and the government. Going so far as to refer to it as a “handmaiden” of government (p.108). Making it easy to infer that Hulsmann believes that the intertangled marriage between Fractional Reserve Banking and government is an unbreakable bond. However, let’s take these suggested conditions as theoretical and contingent upon a banking system free of regulation. See his suggestions below:

“…Fractional reserve banks would have to use a different language than they commonly use because words such as “deposit” are deceptive. They would have to make it clear that money “deposited” with them is, in fact, a credit of unspecified duration. And the “banknotes” they issue would have to be presented not as money titles but as some sort of very liquid IOUs..”

            “..On the “FR notes,” one would have to find a promissory note of the following type:

 The FR Bank promises the holder of this note to try to redeem it out of its gold reserves. Because FR notes are not 100 percent covered by gold presently in our bank, in case we cannot redeem, the following rules apply. . . .  (p.108)”

Is Fractional Reserve Banking Ethical Part II: Contract Theory and the Naysayers

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See Part I: Click.

Introduction to Part II:

The key arguments against fractional reserve banking being a moral system came from a 1998 paper co-authored by Austrian economists Hans Hermann Hoppe, Jorg Guido Hulsmann, and Walter Block. The white paper entitled Against Fiduciary Media was a response to a previous paper written by George Selgin and Lawrence H. White. Hoppe at al. crafted a repudiation against  Selgin and White’s 1996 paper In Defense of Fiduciary Media or, We are Not Devo(lutionists), We are Misesians. In which both scholars provide a normative and positive defense of fractional reserve banking. Even utilizing Murray Rothbard’s Title-transfer Theory of Contract to defend the practice. However, this application of the Rothbardian contract theory did not sit well with Hoppe and the company. All being devoted and unwavering followers of Rothbard believed that Selgin and White’s interpretation of Title-Transfer Theory of Contract to be incorrect. Making their justification of fractional reserve banking on grounds of contract theory to be inherently flawed. It is worth noting that Hoppe was a direct protégé of Murray Rothbard and even owed his career and position teaching at the University of Nevada, Las Vegas to the late Austrian economist.

Rothbard’s  Title-Transfer Theory of Contract:

Before claims that Selgin and White did not faithfully adhere to or misinterpreted Title-Transfer theory, it is important to thoroughly explain this concept. A reader without a firm comprehension of this idea cannot adequately determine if free-banking proponents of fractional reserve banking suffer from profound confusion. The proceeding section will provide a brief overview of this theory. Hereby providing the reader with the requisite background information to justly assess this debate.  

Before diving into Rothbard’s theory, it is important to note his ideological disposition.  Murray Rothbard was the modern father of an ideological subset of libertarianism known as anarcho-capitalism. Rothbard and his followers hold that there should not be limited government, but rather no government. All services and products can be produced by private industry with no necessity for government intervention. This even includes services that have been traditionally provided by the government. This includes defense/security services, law enforcement services, charity, resource management, infrastructure, private legal adjudication, and so on. Rothbardians even go so far as to assert that the government possesses a monopoly on such services. It is imperative to understand this aspect of Rothbard’s political economy and political philosophy. It illustrates the fundamental philosophical precepts that govern his theory of contract.

Rothbardian Contract Theory is expounded upon in his 1982 book The Ethics of Liberty. Rothbard derides that the concept that all contracts in a just society need to be enforced( P.133). He draws a sharp line of delineation between “promised” and “conditional” contingencies in matters of exchange. Per his logic, the utilization of legal channels to enforce a promise is wholly illegitimate. Constitutes the use of government force in a situation in which no property has been transferred. Making it equivalent to state enforcement of morality (p.133-134). The reason why the property needs to be involved for a contract to be valid pertains to the distinction between what is intrinsically alienable and inalienable to the individual. This has to do with the fact that a person cannot alienate their own will or relinquish control of their mind and body to someone else. Humans can quite easily dispense with tangible property, including money (p.135). Due to the fact enforcing a promise is a compulsion because it interferes with the free will of the individual. It is not technically a breach of contract. On the other hand, if the agreement included a transfer of property for non-compliance then it would be another story.

In instances of conditional contracts and agreements, noncompliance is equal to a form of theft.  One salient example Rothbard provides is the circumstances of service providers receiving advanced payment but never providing the service (p.137). For example, if I were to offer to paint your house and I received an advanced payment of $300.00 and never show up your house that is theft. One contractual contingency that can shift a promise to a conditional agreement would be a performance bond clause within the agreement.  For Rothbard’s example, if a movie theater has a meet and greet event with a famous actor, they can put into the agreement a clause where the actor agrees to pay the theater a sum of money for abdicating this obligation (p.137). Since a property can be transferred and not the will of the actor this is an ethically binding agreement. However, failing to fulfill a property-related obligation is not always necessarily deemed as implicit theft. In instances where a creditor provides immunity to a debtor who cannot pay their bill this is legitimate (P.144). Why?  The creditor reserves the right to forgive debts due to the fact they are the ones who transferred their property under the condition of repayment. Please note that this scenario details circumstances in which the credit lent out their funds.

It should be noted that a Rothbardian conception of contractual property rights does not preclude someone from selling off a portion of their property. For example, if I own 100 acres of land in Montana. It is well within my rights to transfer you 5 acres for $20,000.00. Concurrently, retaining my claim on the residual 95 acres of land. This does not mean that mean I in any way still own those 5 acres. Through the sale of this land, I have effectively transferred ownership to you. In turn, I have relinquished by entitlement to the lands sold.

Page 146:

“Another important point: in our title-transfer model, a person should be able to sell not only the full title of ownership to the property but also part of that property, retaining the rest for himself or others to whom he grants or sells that part of the title. Titles, as we have seen above, common-law copyright is justified as the author or publisher selling all rights to his property except the right to resell it.”

How The Free-Banking Argument For Fractional Reserve Banking Violates Contract Theory:

Selgin and White claiming that fractional reserve banking is consistent with Title-Transfer Theory suffer from some blind spots. Blind spots that are fully magnified by Hoppe et al. One of the fundamental chinks in the armor of the Free-Banking argument is that fractional reserve banking inherently violates Title-Transfer Theory. It assumes that two people can own the same piece of property simultaneously (p.21). By the very nature of how fractional reserve banking engages in lending, it creates ambiguity regarding ownership. Through issuing more promissory notes both the bank and the customer assume ownership of the same banknote, which is fraudulent by nature (p.22).  Creating more claims to money against the present supply of money will not create more money (p.22). Rather, will only serve to redistribute the present supply of actual currency from client to client without increasing the amount of money in the vaults (p.22). Effectively creating fiduciary media (money-substitutes issued by a bank that is not backed by gold or paper money) out of thin air without transferring assets or liabilities (p.22). As detailed in Rothbard’s theory, we can sell off a portion of our property. However, we relinquish our own once we transfer it to the party purchasing it.

This illusory arrangement also conflates property with property titles (p.23). Treating and categorizing banknotes( fiduciary media, money claims) as money (physical property). This only enables this fallacy to continue. Keeping in tune with the Austrian tradition the Regression Theorem states that all money had a prior use value (p.34-36). For instance, tobacco and nails at various times in human history have been used as money. Meaning that these banknotes cannot be money in the actual sense, but a claim or title to money. Through this categorical fallacy, the banks can divorce titles from ownership resulting in the redistributive practices of fractional reserve lending (p.23). Even going so far as to promising future entitlement to goods against present goods that may or may not be fulfilled. It would be honest to label these claims to future goods or debt claims, but not a claim to money (p.24).

An inquisitive observer may question why it is dishonest or even outright fraud to categorize future claims to money as money titles or even as money? Hoppe et al. frame this from the standpoint of we cannot claim or transfer ownership from a title to a car for anything but a car and the same applies to money (p.25). If we were using more precise language what banks and customers have truly agreed to is debate claims versus money titles. Per the authors of  Against Fiduciary Media Selgin and White adopted a hyper-subjective interpretation of contracts to side-step this discrepancy (p.26). The misrepresentation engaged in by practitioners of fractional reserve banking extends beyond labels of goods, but to actual quantities as well. By treating fiduciary media as money, it creates the false perception that clients own more than what they truly due on paper. The fabricated money quantities do not reflect the amounts present in the vaults of the bank (p.27). Free-banking proponents may believe that fractional reserve banking isn’t so much the problem, rather government intervention. As long as the withdrawal requests are fulfilled it cannot be tantamount to fraud. However, even without state interference, the transfer practices of fractional reserve banking blur the lines of definitive ownership (p.29). Making the system incompatible with upholding property rights or just contract enforcement.