Bootleggers and Baptists-LVI: The War of the Wok

Photo by Jay Abrantes on Pexels.com

Labor Unions have historically held anti-immigration and nationalistic sentiments on their platforms. This makes the fact Progressives romanticize organized labor somewhat puzzling, as both factions of political actors often have conflicting objectives. One example of the prevailing nativism in the labor movement was Cesar Chavez’s hostility towards immigrants; how contemporary liberals square this cognitive dissonance when they proudly proclaim they are “Pro-Labor” is beyond the veil of reason. It should not be shocking that labor unions were one of the driving forces in implementing anti-Chinese legislation in the early 20th Century. 

The article THE ‘WAR’ AGAINST” CHINESE RESTAURANTS, published in 2017 by Regulation Magazine, provides a historical example of the anti-Chinese sentiments of organized labor. In the early-1900s, the United States excluded Chinese immigrants from most spheres of economic life in the United States; since many jobs required licensing that was only available to U.S. Citizens (p.32). The growing communities of Chinese immigrants in cities like San Francisco were able to enter the food service industry and laundry services. Chinese restauranteurs succeeded in providing a quality and low-cost dining option; birthing the American love affair with chop-suey. This was not without resistance since these new exotic restaurants were siphoning away business from eateries owned and operated by native-born citizens. The American Federation of Labor affiliated, The Cooks’ and Waiters’ Union, was a staunch supporter of anti-Chinese legislation (p.33). Various food service unions boycotted Chinese Restaurants and advocated for laws to loosen their gripe on the restaurant industry.

After the boycotts failed to achieve the Union’s anti-competitive objectives, they decided to lean on the legislature’s pen to reclaim the market share lost by Caucasian restaurant proprietors. The unions had the perfect pretext for demanding regulation (p.13); that was the moral concern of white women. As detailed by Chin and Ormond:

“..Newspapers offered lurid reports that Chinese restaurants were fronts for opium dens, and that Chinese men used opium “as a trap for young girls.” The idea of white female victimization became a media trope. In 1899, King of the Opium Ring, by Charles E. Blaney and Charles A. Taylor, played at the Columbus Theater and the Academy of Music in New York. Later produced around the country, it featured a clown who rescues a young white woman from the balcony of a Chinese restaurant. Movies depicted similar scenes and renowned “realistic” artists painted Chinatown vistas… (p.34).

At the time, there was a profuse amount of propaganda suggesting that Chinese men would try to lure white women into their establishment and then take advantage of them. The upper-class habit of “slumming” made trips to Chinatown a popular destination. There remained a lingering fear that white women would be enticed by the food but would decline into exploitation and degeneracy. Organized labor capitalized on this perception of Chinese immigrants and utilized it to provide the pretext for creating laws that would derail the success of Sino-dining establishments. Most of these measures varied by state and municipality, the majority of these laws either restricting or barring white women from entering or being employed in Chinese restaurants (p. 34-37). The unions have since given up on these measures once Chinese restaurants no longer appeared to be a threat and have since moved on to other policy issues (p.37). This chapter in American history perfectly embodies the incentives and dynamics of Bruce Yandle’s Bootleggers and Baptists (1983) model of coalitions. Regardless of the veracity of the claims of Chinese men seducing white women, it is still a “moralistic” concern as it posits a normative motive for enacting such ordinances and state legislation. Some of the holy-rollers included missionaries who entered Chinese neighborhoods proselytizing Christianity, who purportedly witness this moral impropriety (p.34). It should be conspicuous who the Bootleggers are in this scenario, as a union in themselves are nothing more than glorified lobbyists whose pedigree of rent-seeking can be traced back to the medieval guilds.

Prisoner’s Dilemmas: XI – DACA and Labor Shortages

Photo by Ahmed akacha on Pexels.com

DACA (Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivalsis a controversial immigration initiative from the Obama administration. Implemented in 2012, it extended deferred action (“…administrative relief from deportation..”) to undocumented immigrants that came into the United States as children, albeit the following criteria:

“…To be eligible for DACA, applicants must meet several eligibility requirements such as: have entered the United States before their 16th birthday, be currently in school, a high school graduate or be honorably discharged from the military, be under 31 years of age, and not have been convicted of a felony, significant misdemeanor, or otherwise pose a threat to national security….”

migration.org/glossary/daca

However, this Obama-era policy has proven to be quite contentious, especially considering the nativist proclivities of the Trump administration. This sentiment is reflected in the Southern District of Texas ruling in  State of Texas et al v. United States of America et al ruling DACA to be illegal. There are many arguments for restricting immigration, but it is possible that limiting immigration could produce problematic consequences? Adverse outcomes beyond the lofty ideals of multiculturalism? Currently, in the United States, there is a labor shortage, being dubbed the Great Resignation. More people are declining to participate or return to back to the workforce. Labor force participation was reflected as 61.9 percent as of December 2021.; when compared to December 2019, 63.3 percent.

The discrepancy in workforce participation between 2019 and 2021 may seem minor, but to see the severity of the effect, one only needs to view the lack of staffing at the local grocery store. Combined with global supply chain shortages it becomes apparent that commodities and entry-level labor are in short supply. Does the question become why further decrease the pool of potential workers through cracking down on immigration? Then arises the erroneous myth that immigration, specifically illegal immigration harms American workers. Most Americans polled even admit that immigrants assume job roles that most native-born citizens are unwilling to perform. It should note that deporting DACA-eligible workers would also exacerbate current worker shortages in higher-paid jobs considering nearly a quarter of DACA have attained a college degree (p.2).

If anything, considering the current economic conditions, restricting immigration/ deporting undocumented workers could result in a Prisoner’s Dilemma. A mutual defection between undocumented immigrants that entered the United States as children (DACA Dreamers) and the vigilant “immigration hawks”. By the very fact, the dreams refuse to go back to their country of “origin” this could be seen as an implicit defection against the immigration hawks who seek to deport all illegal immigrations and be strict about who is permitted to assume residency in the United States. Naturally, the incentives structures between the two groups are irreconcilable, the odds of a mutually acceptable compromise are slim-to-none; the immigration debate is a winner-take-all game. Compromise can be achieved in politics but is rendered untenable because of political polarization. Immigration has become a hotly contested wedge issue where making concessions are no longer fashionable. The immigration hawks do not realize that they are shooting themselves in the foot. When labor shortages impact establishments ranging from the drive-thru to the emergency room, it affects everyone. Regardless of their position on immigration, making it asinine to refuse willing labor participation the right to work.

Bootleggers & Baptists XXXIX- AB-5 and Uber

Photo by Jackson David on Pexels.com

The emergence of the Gig Economy has allowed millions of Americans to earn additional money without the constraints of rigid work schedules. However, the flexibility allotted to contractors through ride-sharing and food delivery services is under threat in California. Back in 2019, the California legislature passed Assembly Bill 5 (AB-5) that would classify many freelance workers as “… workers bona fide employees, with schedules and hours determined by the company rather than the worker..” (p.4). The California courts apply AB-5 under the three-prong test developed in Dynamex Operations v. Superior Court to distinguish contractors from full employees; after AB-2257 passed in 2020, “..109 categories of workers were exempted from AB-5..” (p.7). In response to AB-5, delivery and ride-sharing platforms collectively generated Proposition 22 to exempt these services from the law (p.7). Unfortunately, the law was ruled as unconstitutional 2021; per the Los Angeles Times:

That’s in part because the law, Roesch wrote, infringes on the power of the Legislature explicitly granted by the state Constitution to regulate compensation for workers’ injuries.

 Hector Castellanos, et al. v. State of California, et al.

Amid all the AB-5 turmoil, one question emerges, who benefits from labeling gig workers as full-employees? It certainly isn’t the Uber driver. Considering, 80% of surveyed independent contractors “…reported having done some sort of independent contracting gig in the last year said that it was a part-time occupation…” (p.6). Also, most gig workers have insurance benefits either from their primary job or spouse (p.5) and prefer the flexibility over fringe benefits that “…bear opportunity costs in the form of foregone income they could have received if not for the benefits.” (p.6).

When viewed through the lens of Bootleggers and Baptist (1983), it is clear that few economic agents are hiding within the smokescreen of the workers’ rights coalition. The irony is, the demographic that AB-5 is designed to “help’, vehemently opposed the legislation. It can be assumed that the California legislature is a Dual-Role Actor in this coalition. Why? State lawmakers most likely passed this law as a worker protection provision for gig economy employees. However, Judge Roesch’s admission that excluding gig workers interferes with the authority of the legislature. Lawmakers are also Bootleggers for having an invested interest in not relinquishing political power.

 One notable economic agent on the bootlegger side of the coalition would be labor unions. Some readers may wonder why labor unions would not be considered a Baptist or even a Dual-Role Actor. Unions are heavily involved in the political process (p.410), theoretically could be perceived more as political interest groups than employee protection organizations. Arguably, these organizations do little to advance the interests of workers. Labor unions within the state of California had angled to organize ride-share drivers, “…contributing to the pressure on legislators to make a change..”(p.7). Various labor unions throughout California have expressed that AB-5 would reduce the exploitation of contract employees. However, they benefit from this legislative victory because it reinforces their political currency as an interest group. One union that stands to gain the most from reclassifying Uber drivers are taxicab unions. It is well known that the taxicab industry has struggled to compete with the convenience and lower rates of ride-sharing apps. The state of Nevada has placed restrictions on platforms offering ride-sharing services. Uber has faced many regulatory barriers often supported by taxi drivers (p.191); most notably “medallion systems” where governments issue a limited number of licenses to operate as a driver (p.574). Classifying Uber drivers as full-employees would make employing contractors more costly and onerous, thereby disturbing Uber’s operations. All of this to shield taxi drivers from the Schumpeterian gales of creative destruction.

Editorial Graveyard- Part III: The Bootlegger and Baptists of Woke Capitalism

Photo by Brett Sayles on Pexels.com

Op-Ed submission was rejected by the Foundation For Economic Education for being too “abstract” and “academic”. The corresponding paper proposal for George Mason was also rejected. I am currently working on another proposal for GMU focused on intellectual property.

Introduction:

Bruce Yandle’s Bootlegger and Baptist (1983)  theory of regulation presents a practical explanation for why such unorthodox coalitions are effective vehicles for camouflaging rent-seeking behavior by a firm. In brief, armed with the public appeal of the moral arguments posited by the Baptists, the Bootleggers can quietly lurk in the shadows, funding initiatives that will advance their self-interest. In other words, the ethical advocates create a smokescreen that provides cover for the business interests, superficially obscuring the stigma of corporate advocacy, since few examples of political action invoke the ire of the average citizen than policy campaigns that line the pockets of big business.

           The trend of “woke capitalism”, however, is bringing the Bootleggers out of shadows and into plain sight. CEOs are now openly standing in unison with political activists, speaking out against topics ranging from police brutality to environmental issues. The Bootleggers can work openly with the Baptists to promote a positive image while still silently providing monetary support in the background. Moreover, the social justice messaging of “Woke Capitalism” extends beyond corporate activism and is observable in the product market and advertising. Some companies, for example, adopt marketing that emphasizes social consciousness to secure the business of Gen-Z. A clear example is Gillette’s 2019 advertising campaign addressing “toxic masculinity”. Typically, companies use this tactic to target younger consumers with higher preferences for ethical products and brand authenticity, requiring companies to go beyond philanthropy and mandating community services hours for their employees; their woke ethics are thereby conveyed in their branding.

The Four Main Categories of Woke Capitalistic Coalitions:

           The most recent alliances forged between business interests and political activists take the form of four main taxonomical categories. Some of the various types of Bootlegger and Baptist coalitions feature collaboration between firms and activists. Other coalition types  form within the technocratic structure of the corporation or emerge between different departments within the organization. Woke coalitions thus have several notable classifications of “woke” corporate alliances. Two further subcategories include proactive and reactive forms of rent-seeking.

Reactive Coalition Models:

           The reactive models for “woke” coalitions include two subtypes of collective action organization, the interaction between external actors and collaboration between internal employees. The first variety of reactive coalitions are rent-seeking alliances formed to restore the company from a sullied reputation caused by criticism, the objective being to mitigate the loss of sales and reputation amid public controversy. Some firms thus attempt to distance themselves from the controversy through their activistic partnerships. By way of example, Bank of America in the past was accused of engaging in “discriminatory” lending practices. To counteract this negative publicity, last year BOA pledged to donate $1 Billion over the next four years to community programs to address economic and racial inequality. Such an act of philanthropy can easily make the general public forget about the firm’s past indiscretions.

The second type of reactive “woke” coalitions are the intracompany factions designed to divert attention from potentially costly internal controversies. In instances of hostile work environment ligation, the legal team, the human resources department, and executive management band together to deescalate the publicity nightmare. Human Resources and management work together to legally distance the company from a harassment incident and shield executive management from more scrutiny and accountability. Legal navigates the statutory and tort concerns and works internally to establish an anti-harassment campaign intracompany. A prime example of an internal diversionary coalition was Vice media’s response to sexual harassment claims. After settling several cases, the company decided to form an advisory board to educate employees on diversity and proper workplace deportment. Even if such an initiative on the part of the human resources department failed to soften the bad publicity, at least it may decrease the probability of another incident.

Reactive Coalition Models:

Finally, the last two variants of “woke” coalitions aligning business interests with moral advocates to facilitate proactive forms of rent-seeking. Similarly, these proactive coalitions can be delineated into examples of internal and external collaboration models. Proactive partnerships form to capture potential gains and avert the costs of prospective controversies. The most salient example of such external cooperation would be firms standing behind a woke cause, anticipating that such an alliance will obscure the firm attempting to shape current regulation (regulatory capture).  A notable example was detailed in the Fall 2021 issue of Regulation magazine, which showed how providers of cloud computing services IBM and Oracle joined forces in 2017 to advocate for the passage of  the Stop Enabling Sex Traffickers Act (SESTA) and the Fight Online Sex Trafficking Act (FOSTA); effectively becoming bedfellows with various factions of human rights activists. Both laws intended to attribute liability to digit platforms for any user content that promotes sex trafficking. The article’s author Thomas A. Lambert speculates that IBM and Oracle could have done this with the hopes crafting potential exceptions to the platform liability portions of SESTA and FOSTA.

Additionally, we cannot forget the proactive inter-department coalitions that are emerging within corporations. For example, several companies are hiring diversity and inclusion “coaches” as a peripheral subset of human resources. The demand for this job role has become so prevalent that a number of colleges offer programs to become a certified “diversity practitioner”. The human resources department defends the existence of these staff members by emphasizing the need to educate employees to avoid instances of harassment and discrimination. The diversity coaches preach the virtues of cultural sensitivity and other tenants of the “woke” philosophy, thus producing a self-reinforcing spiral justifying further diversity initiatives.

Conclusion:

 Superficially, these alliances between big business and “woke” activists seem relatively benign, but in reality, these coalitions have profound consequences for the integrity of capitalism and the rule of law. The four types of woke B&B coalitions described above undermine capitalism and the rule of law because woke capitalism has made it easier than ever for business interests to create the façade of morality but are unjustly bending the rules-of-the game in their favor. Wokeism provides the veil obscuring corporate America’s hand in the legislative till. Generating more anti-competitive laws that undermine both the rule of law and free trade. 

The emphasis on firms getting involved with “woke” causes not only disguises crony capitalism and rent-seeking behavior, but also distracts companies from their primary custodial duty to their shareholders. As Nobel laureate Milton Friedman expresses in his own Friedman Doctrine , a firm has a duty to maximize its profits for its shareholders. After all, these individuals have invested in the company expecting a higher return. Without this financial support the firm could not achieve its current level of success. Diverting funds that could be used for investment in capital to increase productive efficiency for political activism is tantamount to theft.

Bootleggers & Baptists: XXXVII: Salmon in Alaska (The Fight Against GMO Food)

Photo by Huy Phan on Pexels.com

Genetically modified food is a flashpoint in the public debate over the wholesomeness of the modern diet. Many speculate that consuming GMOs has been linked to several various health problems. Few people question whether there are any benefits to producing genetically modified food products. There is a bit of irony here since most anti-GMO activists also happen to be exponents of environmentalism. In certain situations, GMO food could feasibly be sustainable alternatives to dwindling supplies of natural food sources. One salient example is in the market for edible fish. 

The Fall 2021 issue of Regulation magazine details the struggle of AquAdvantage to obtain approval from the FDA for their edible genetically modified salmon. However, even after nearly 13 years of pending FDA approval, AquAdvantage still has other legal hurdles to clear, obstructing their entry into the market of consumable fish. This threat is coming from the political and business interests in the state of Alaska. Sen. Lisa Murkowski (R–AK) assuming the veneer of consumer production advocate; argues that consumers need to know what they are consuming. Murkowski:

“… attached a rider to the FY 2019 appropriations bill that required genetically engineered salmon approved before the labeling standards created by the U.S. Department of Agriculture’s National Bioengineered Food Disclosure Standard regulation to include the words “genetically engineered” in its market name — a requirement seemingly intended to spook consumers…” (P.3).

The “moral” concern expressed by Murkowski; creates a dynamic conducive to Bootlegger and Baptist’s (1983) coalitions. Murkowski can be considered a Baptist for articulating consumer protection concerns for the stringent labeling requirements. She also could arguably fall into the category of Duel-Role Actor if her consumer protection advocacy is sincere. After all, Murkowski is a politician and has an incentive to appease her constituency. Consumer protection advocacy is a win-win strategy. Since the average voter may superficially perceive this initiative as being in their best interest, of their health and safety, continue to vote for Murkowski. But arguably, the most more powerful voter-bloc she will need to win would be the salmon fisherman and hatcheries. The industry surrounding food-grade salmon production is estimated to generate $600 million annually in economic output. Making it quite evident who the Bootleggers are! However, placing restrictions on genetically modified salmon creates a bit of a Prisoners Dilemmaas the U.S. producers cannot meet domestic demand for salmon, 90 % of all salmon sold in America is imported.  

Bootleggers & Baptists-XXXV: Multiple Listing Services & Real Estate

Photo by Curtis Adams on Pexels.com

It is well known that trade associations and related organizations have an anticompetitive effect on the market. One salient example of such consequences is American Real estate. Per Vol. 44, Issue 2 of Regulation Magazine, the rules favored trade association, National Association of Realtors (NAR), has created an implicit tying-agreement. The NAR established the networks known as Multiple Listing Services which home listing with a NAR-affiliated realty agent are posted (p.28). Frequently potential homebuyers are persuaded to avoid purchasing homes listed outside of the MLS network, referred to as For-Sale-By-Owner (FSBO), in a practice known as steering (p.28, 30). In such a system, the commission for the broker is not only predetermined but also “… the listening agent must make a blanket-unilateral offer in advance to pay the buyer’s broker’s fee… despite not having information on the services provided…” (p.30). It should be noted that tying agreements are often scrutinized by the U.S government (see the USA v. Microsoft Corp, No. 97-5343 (D.C. Cir. 1998)).

As another variant of anticompetitive market behavior, there are generally moral arguments for supporting the measure. This means that advocacy for maintaining this system is subject to Bootlegger and Baptist’s (1983) dynamics. Concurrently, while some argue that the MLS system from a consumer interest standpoint inevitably NAR realtors are the ones that benefit. Our Bootleggers realtors profit handsomely. Not only does this practice allow the buying brokers from having to negotiate fees, but American realtors are paid “… two to three times higher than in other developed nations..” (p.30). Effectively operating as a transfer of wealth from the consumer to the service provider (p.30). However, some realty companies such as Clever Real Estate assume as a Dual-Role Actor. Such a firm is a beneficiary of the current trade practices; they also argue that the MLS system is more convenient for sellers to expediently sell their homes

Bootleggers and Baptists XXXIII- The Three-Tiered Distribution of Beer in the “Bible Belt”

Photo by cottonbro on Pexels.com

The southeastern region of the United States has a peculiar relationship with alcoholic beverages. Southern states such as Kentucky and Tennessee have a long history of whiskey production. The south is also the home of many conservative Baptists that view alcohol consumption as being immoral. The result of the ethical opposition has been the formation of dry counties and onerous laws governing alcohol production and sales. Presenting more opportunities for interest groups (Bootleggers) to find ways of strategically gaming the system from multiple points of the supply chain (p.386). Often the Bootleggers, operate as a source of backdoor funding for morally justifiable policy campaigns (Regulation Magazine, Vol 44, No.1, p.14-15). The geographic “chessboard” strategy of keeping dry counties adjacent to wet counties dry is far from the only approach deployed by various interest groups (p.397).

Another strategy used by business interests in the south’s beer industry is regulatory capture. A means of leveraging market power to mold regulations to the benefit of corporations; is a typical extension of soft-political power used by corporations throughout the United States. States such as Georgia have long prohibited direct-to-customer sales from breweries, historically referred to as tied-house (p.390). States that have permitted self-distribution by smaller brewers since 1978 have seen more growth in craft breweries (p.392). These restrictions date back to the legally sanctioned distribution arrangement of tiered distribution systems. In this system, beer is distributed to retail outlets via a licensed distributor. Favored by larger breweries such as Pabst and Miller since the market share they lost in the years before the Volstead Act from smaller breweries self-distributing their beer (p.390). The reason why bigger breweries still favor these archaic laws is that they would rather not have to compete with the dizzying array of microbreweries for shelf space (p.395).

However, has the moral argument of limiting direct sales reduced the instances of problematic drinking held up to scrutiny? That would be resounding no. Empirically, restricting direct alcohol sales has had little influence on overall alcohol consumption (p.399). It also should be noted that craft breweries have stronger connections to their communities. As stated by the executive director of the Georgia Craft Beer Guild:

“….I would like to think that craft breweries, because of the community connection, aren’t nearly the threat to intemperance that multi-nationals are, or Wal-Mart…”

Bootlegger’s and Baptists XXIX- Arkansas and “Wet Counties”

Photo by cottonbro on Pexels.com

In the political process, many coalitions are symbiotic relationships that require the resources from both groups to successfully achieve results. The classic Bootleggers and Baptist  (1983) model best exemplify this very fact. However, there has always been the implication that this political relationship has always been one-sided. The Baptists do all the heavy lifting from a public relations standpoint, meanwhile, the Bootleggers lurk in the shadows as silent beneficiaries. Superficially it almost seems as if the Bootleggers are free riders how to prosper at the expense of those who risk their reputation for controversial positions. But typically in the political landscape of the United States morality isn’t enough. In the absence of adequate funding, a political campaign ends up being dead on arrival. Because money is required for advertising, organizing outreach events, and other means of communicating the campaign’s message. Often for what the Baptists lack in finances, the Bootleggers tend to contribute to the initiative. This is due to the Bootleggers frequently being involved in business and having a serious monetary stake in the issue. It would be a mistake to interpret this previous statement as a value judgment since anyone of us would do what we could to defend our paychecks.

One excellent example of this dynamic was detailed in the Spring 2021 issue of Regulation magazine (Vol 44, No. 1), published by the Cato Institute. Presented in the article Not So Unlikely Coalitions (p.12-15) written by economics professor Jeremy Horpedahl. The article focused on the legalization of alcohol in various counties throughout the state of Arkansas. Since the repeal of prohibition, the re-legalization of alcohol sales has been done incrementally at the county level. By state law, the legal status of alcoholic beverages can be altered by being voted on as a referendum. Similar to how the Marijuana relegalization issue is being handled now, except at lower level governance. For the initiative to appear on the ballot a petition must be signed by 38 % of the “.. jurisdiction’s voters..”. The author also notes that regionally voter turn is approximately less than 50 %, meaning that last-minute campaigns to halt the legalization process tend to be ineffective (p.14).

In Arkansas, the alliance between religious leaders and liquors stores in adjacent “wet counties” in Missouri have been proven to be effective. Both sides of the coalition found that it is better to direct campaigning efforts towards keeping the referendum on the ballot rather than beating it at the ballot box. Generally, once an initiative to re-legalize alcohol reaches the voters in Arkansas it tends to pass.  During the 2010s, Craighead, Crawford, Faulkner, Independence, Johnson, Randolph, and Yell counties all successfully prevented alcohol legalization from appearing on the ballot. Bootlegger interest groups easily raising over $100,000 to fund various PACs to defeat the bill before it even reaches the ballot box. Funds are being allotted to press interviews with local religious leaders and various media campaigns (p.14). It should be noted that areas that are landlocked between other dry counties lack any liquor stores to act as the Bootlegger interest group leaving the Baptists on their own for obtaining funds (p.15). However, per Horpedahl there has been a new entrance to the political interest game operating as Bootlegger for the legalization side, Walmart. The titan of retail raised over  $700,000.00 in 2014  to support the legalization effort in  Saline county dwarfing the contributions of the opposing set of Bootleggers ($157,500.00) (p.15).

It is easy to perceive the role of the Bootlegger as being almost parasitic. The Bootlegger interests idly standby while the Baptist do all the leg work of persuading the public. Upon reviewing Professor Horpedahl’s s article it becomes quite clear that the Bootleggers do assist in supporting political advocacy, they just happen to do so in the shadows. These business interests are forced to conceal their direct involvement in public policy due to the stigma of the intermarrying of business and politics. Demonstrated by the fact terms such as “dark money” have now entered the public consciousness. Leading most to express skepticism of the purported intentions of corporations when they tip their toes into the pool of political advocacy.