One counteractive observation made in the paper A Note on the centralized regulatory review (1984) is to centralize the review of regulation; to a single government bureau. Most libertarians would take issue with consolidating political power into one entity. However, as Miller, Shughart, and Tollison, explains centralization may benefit the private interests that oppose the implementation of the regulation. As befuddling as this suggestion may seem, this impacts the transaction costs of opposing government action.
“…In contrast, centralized oversight enables diffuse interests to focus their lobbying against rent-creating regulation on one location rather than splitting those efforts among a variety of regulatory agencies. In effect, centralization sums the individual welfare losses created by the regulatory bodies subject to its jurisdiction. When one considers the prevalence of regulatory intervention in the economy, the overall cost to diffuse is likely to be quite substantial. Summing the individual welfare losses from rulemaking activities that create rents raises the rate of return to lobbying against such regulation. Accordingly, more opposition will be forthcoming. (p.86-87)..”
While this may incur more costs for the lobbyist who pray upon the concept of “…concentrated benefits and dispersed costs..”, reciprocally, this would reduce the costs for private parties (grassroots coalitions of average citizens) looking to defeat the pending legislation.
“…In consequence, centralization will result in more speeches being made against rent- creating rulemaking, more articles written on the subject of regulatory reform, more letters and telephone calls to Congress from concerned consumers, more campaign contributions to politicians advocating deregulation in the economic area (and more and improved regulation in the social area), more consumer lobbying groups being formed, and so forth. The argument we have presented applies to any situation in which rent-seeking opportunities exist within a decentralized administrative framework. Centralization alters the relative rates of return to lobbying for various coalitions, generally in favor of groups having diffuse interests…” (p.87).
The “…diffused interests…” referred to by Miller, Shughart, and Tollison would be the coalitions of regular voters. Potentially, rallying against divisive “wedge issues” such as the Second Amendment or Abortion. Usually, grassroots political movements will not have the capital to petition multiple bureaus the way entrenched interest groups (lobbyists) influence government action. The centralization may seem like an institutional drive to expand the scope of government, but it may have the opposite effect on lobbying. Realigning the incentives of grassroots activities by reducing the costs of devoting resources towards political action.
The libertarian party is arguably the most disorganized political party in the United States.
For years, debates have waged over the gulf between the actual political philosophy and the official party’s platform. Many hardcore libertarians feel the party has long since lost its way. For many disillusioned lovers of liberty; the remedy came in the form of the Mises Caucus founded in 2017. The emergence of this faction within the LP has been met with controversy. As more members of the caucus assume leadership roles within the national party, concerns arise regarding the tendinous social views of this strain of libertarianism. Accusations of racism and transphobia have surfaced and put the Mises Caucus in the crosshairs of LP party leadership.
To the casual observer, this tension in the LP may seem like a new development; but the political in-fighting has been a fixture of the party’s institutional dynamics since its inception in the 1970s. The antipathy sowed between the libertarian establishment and Austro-libertarianism dates back to the founding of the Cato Institute. The intellectual father of the political movement sweeping the structure of the LP was none other than economist Murray Rothbard. Rothbard co-founded the institute with the vision of it being an academic nexus between libertarian thought and Austrian economics. Rothbard’s unwillingness to compromise on Cato’s messaging, he was ousted from the institute. He then moved on to establish the Mises Institute in the early 1980s. It is reasonable to this one event as a manifestation of a major schism within libertarianism. A rivalry formed between the moderate libertarian political philosophy and the convictions of full-on anarcho-capitalism. A system of beliefs exalting ideological purity, articulating rhetoric steeped in social conservatism and the mechanism of Austrian economics.
The competing philosophies of Cato and the Mises Institute are the lines between academic establishment and the populist tendencies of the liberty movement. Cato has the ear of the academy, while the Mises orbit has the ear of the people. However, this is not to say there isn’t a deep tradition of scholarly work within the Austro-libertarian tradition; the cadre of academics advancing this political philosophy has to produce voluminous amounts of literature. Cato has not had the same effect on the advancement of libertarianism on the ground level. Aside from the popularity of Rothbard’s polemical pamphlets in the 1970s and 1980s; the movement gained new life in the 2000s with the Presidential campaign of Ron Paul. The Cato Institute attempted to distance itself from Ron Paul for his reluctance to condemn political extremism. Former Senator Paul was an instrumental figure in founding the Mises Institute. He has also had longstanding professional relationships with figures such as Lew Rockwell and Rothbard.
The variety of libertarianism with a hint of social conservatism advocated for by Ron Paul and the Mises Institute cannot disavow extremism as it is part of their political strategy. In contrast to the libertarian establishment, Austro-libertarians have formed alliances with paleo-conservatives, injecting planks of Old Right sensibilities into their platform. Libertarians favoring this hard-right strategy perceive the virtues of multiculturalism and cosmopolitanism to be treasonous to individual liberty. Many Rothbardians/Hoppeans believe that policies such as open immigration will erode cultural identity, and private property rights and expand the welfare state.
This is not to insinuate that the Mises Institute nor Ron Paul’s campaign was managed by Klansmen. That would be a bad faith assessment of the political dynamics of Austro-libertarianism, there is not enough evidence to make such a claim. The attempts to annex populous conservatives and the far-right were more pragmatism on Rothbard’s part. The run-of-the-mill country club Reaganite Republican will not have any appetite to “end the fed”; naturally this individual would be a lackluster bedfellow in such an endeavor. On the other hand, a gentleman living in the rural south, raised in an environment of culturally entrenched conservatism and a distaste for centralization, would be a more likely partner in crime.
Rothbard could foresee the logical instability in the Reaganite brand of “fusionism”. The political progeny of National Review editor Frank Meyer; a doctrine suggesting that libertarians and conservatives should make minor compromises and join forces to gain more ground in American politics. Realistically, this approach is shortsighted in a climate of winner-take-allpolitics. Disagreements on core wedge issues will eventually create fault lines that cannot be repaired. Rothbard’s vision of liberty was immoderate and immune from the debasing effects of implicit logrolling.
The strife between the two warring factions of libertarianism is nothing short of a textbook example of a prisoner’s dilemma. Frank Meyer was not off base with such a suggestion of political compromise, but neither party agrees to make any concessions. The very stance of the Mises Caucus and other Austro-libertarian organizations is nothing more than an automatic defection. Their hard-nosed commitment to ideological integrity has already taken the possibility of bargaining off the table. Developing a libertarian with the rigidity of Aristotle’s ethical virtue of “right reason”; which is utterly inflexible. The libertarian insiders in the Washington D.C. belt away may garner more appeal to establishments and academics outside of the movement; due to their ideological moderation. These movers and shakers at the think tanks have made no effort to reach out to the populous wing of the libertarian party. If anything, they have either ignored or condemned Ron Paul supporters as hopeless racists or conspiracy-mongering dingbats. None of this is productive when it comes to advancing a political philosophy. It is as much of defection as the resolute principles of the droves of lay libertarians regularly reading the Mises Wire.
The suboptimal results engendered by this mutual defection should be conspicuous; we have yet to have had a true Libertarian in the oval office since the establishment of the official party. The overall lack of consensus has stymied libertarianism’s influence on American politics. There are always several groups arguing over what libertarianism truly is; instead of working together to make an impact. This gives outsiders the impression that libertarians are politically disorganized. It is not that they are a bunch of lazy hippies, bearded mountain men, or a gaggle of goofy naked men kvetching about drivers’ licenses. The party has been sidetracked by years of internal conflict, making this turmoil the ultimate collective action problem.
The Mises Caucus might be the “Trump moment” for the LP, a populous takeover of the formal structure of the political organization.
2. This is not a defense of the Mises Caucus nor a jab at the libertarian establishment. Rather, it is an expression of how neither subset of the LP is willing to compromise with the other.
“…To be eligible for DACA, applicants must meet several eligibility requirements such as: have entered the United States before their 16th birthday, be currently in school, a high school graduate or be honorably discharged from the military, be under 31 years of age, and not have been convicted of a felony, significant misdemeanor, or otherwise pose a threat to national security….”
However, this Obama-era policy has proven to be quite contentious, especially considering the nativist proclivities of the Trump administration. This sentiment is reflected in the Southern District of Texas ruling in State of Texas et al v. United States of America et al ruling DACA to be illegal. There are many arguments for restricting immigration, but it is possible that limiting immigration could produce problematic consequences? Adverse outcomes beyond the lofty ideals of multiculturalism? Currently, in the United States, there is a labor shortage, being dubbed the Great Resignation. More people are declining to participate or return to back to the workforce. Labor force participation was reflected as 61.9 percent as of December 2021.; when compared to December 2019, 63.3 percent.
The discrepancy in workforce participation between 2019 and 2021 may seem minor, but to see the severity of the effect, one only needs to view the lack of staffing at the local grocery store. Combined with global supply chain shortages it becomes apparent that commodities and entry-level labor are in short supply. Does the question become why further decrease the pool of potential workers through cracking down on immigration? Then arises the erroneous myth that immigration, specifically illegal immigration harms American workers. Most Americans polled even admit that immigrants assume job roles that most native-born citizens are unwilling to perform. It should note that deporting DACA-eligible workers would also exacerbate current worker shortages in higher-paid jobs considering nearly a quarter of DACA have attained a college degree (p.2).
If anything, considering the current economic conditions, restricting immigration/ deporting undocumented workers could result in a Prisoner’s Dilemma. A mutual defection between undocumented immigrants that entered the United States as children (DACA Dreamers) and the vigilant “immigration hawks”. By the very fact, the dreams refuse to go back to their country of “origin” this could be seen as an implicit defection against the immigration hawks who seek to deport all illegal immigrations and be strict about who is permitted to assume residency in the United States. Naturally, the incentives structures between the two groups are irreconcilable, the odds of a mutually acceptable compromise are slim-to-none; the immigration debate is a winner-take-all game. Compromise can be achieved in politics but is rendered untenable because of political polarization. Immigration has become a hotly contested wedge issue where making concessions are no longer fashionable. The immigration hawks do not realize that they are shooting themselves in the foot. When labor shortages impact establishments ranging from the drive-thru to the emergency room, it affects everyone. Regardless of their position on immigration, making it asinine to refuse willing labor participation the right to work.
The process of Implicit Logrolling (Buchanan & Tullock,1962) is a form of indirect vote-trading that heavily relies on the bundling of wedge issues. By way of tying specific groupings of policies to attract targeted demographics of voters to a political platform. This political strategy is especially effective in capturing the commitment of single-issue voters. These voters need to tacitly accept the rest of the policies on the political platform to have their one area of interest acknowledged. This is why implicit logrolling is such an effective mechanism in shaping the American political landscape.
Most analysts ignore how voters reconcile selecting programs and political candidates that hold logically inconsistent views. For example, an individual that defends abortion rights on the grounds of a bodily integrity argument concurrently favoring vaccine mandates. Here is where the Paradox of Implicit Logrolling comes in; voters then must rationalize these discrepancies due to the lack of logical consistency. In vote trading, the individual voter expects to make some concessions. However, when these concessions present logical and philosophical contradictions, few people question the conflict. In short, the paradox describes how people are willing to accept contrary political positions if parceled with a party or policy they favor.
The process of implicit logrolling (p.101) is a form of indirect vote-trading that heavily relies on the bundling of wedge issues. By way of tying specific groupings of policies and candidates to attract target demographics of voters. Per Buchanan and Tullock (1962), such arrangements encompassing political platforms can be manipulated by “…political entrepreneurs…”. Simultaneously considering the zealous nature of many single-issue voters, it is easy to see why implicit logrolling is such an effective mechanism in shaping the American political landscape. If the American voters continue to support controversial political positions, implicit logrolling will be effective.
Most analysts ignore how voters reconcile selecting programs and political candidates that hold logically inconsistent views. For example, an individual that defends abortion rights on the grounds of a bodily integrity argument concurrently favoring vaccine mandates. Whatever happened to “my body, my choice”? Although, if this individual held both positions on the grounds of an externalities argument, perhaps there might not be any logical discrepancies. However, few voters delve that deep into the logic of their political philosophies. Here lies the Paradox of Implicit Logrolling; political platforms drive voters to support policies they would not otherwise choose. We have most saliently observed this phenomenon in the demographic shifts within the Republican Party. The GOP was once favoring free trade, now advocates for tariffs.
The abortion debate is arguably one of the most oversimplified contentious issues in all of public policy. The intricacies of navigating the legal statutes and case precedence that shapes the regulations governing the practice are oftentimes are glossed over in public discourse. This rash reductionist approach has shifted a complex topic into a simple categorical dichotomy. Easily making it a fervent “wedge issue” that has formulated many pithy platitudes and “bump-sticker slogans”. These slogans which are so pleasing to the ear could have effortless you contrived by a marketing team. All operate more like a carefully constructed marketing campaign than a multi-disciplinary analysis. This not only makes the abortion debate stale and uninspiring but highly predictable because both sides of the fence utilize an “all-or-nothing” strategy of argumentation. This is highly imprecise for a subject that is steeped in nuisance and minuscule details. Below is the list of disciplines that intersect in the abortion debate:
If a pertinent area of study was neglected, I sincerely apologize. However, while not completely exhaustive, this list conveys exactly how complex the issue is. The intersection of all these vast areas of study converges on a single point, the refutation or the defense of Roe V. Wade (1972).This one case has become the quintessential Schellingian focal point in the abortion debate. Potentially providing some insight into why the debate is so one-dimensional.